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Introduction—
“Reborn from its own embers”: Conversion as a Gradual Process
The search for moral clarity is a fundamental human endeavor. This thesis will
examine issues of morality and moral obligation in Graham Greene’s The Human Factor
and Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited. I will argue that both novels pose moral
frameworks that subvert the flawed twentieth century ethos of materialism and State
ideology. Through the use of textual evidence, theory, and my own analytical
terminology, I intend to explore the tense moral dynamics which pervade The Human
Factor and Brideshead. The structure of my thesis begins with an introduction, followed
by a chapter focusing on theory, a chapter focusing on The Human Factor, a chapter
focusing on Brideshead, and a conclusion. As far the structure of this introduction, I will
begin by introducing my key terms. I will then move into an explanation of why I have
chosen to work with these particular authors, Evelyn Waugh and Graham Greene.
Finally, I offer a study of conversion theory which will provide a groundwork for my
analysis of moral obligation.
The two key terms which I will apply to The Human Factor are “the human
family” and “gamification.” Gamification is a product of 20th century materialism which
threatens to reduce humanity to an amoral game—politics, espionage, and war are viewed
as opportunities to win points over a perceived opponent. Any people involved in the
game are morphed into expendable pawns. The human family is an alternate perspective
which places our moral obligation to other people in familial terms. That is, our moral
obligation for people around the world is akin to the obligation we have for our nuclear
families. The human family prompts us to consider and help people beyond our close
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friends and nuclear family. Though we may not know the people who are suffering in
other parts of the world, these people are connected to us. They are not mere pawns to be
sacrificed for political gain.
The two key terms which I will apply to Brideshead are “love in the present” and
“the perfection fallacy.” Love in the present poses that we have a moral obligation to love
people not solely for who they once were or for who they might be, but for who they are
in the present. This theory applies to love for ourselves as well; fixation on past mistakes
or on future travails hinders our ability to love ourselves. If we do not love ourselves in
the present, we cannot accept our decisions of the past and the uncertainty of the future.
Love in the present subverts a problematic 20th century ideology which I have termed the
perfection fallacy. The perfection fallacy is a fallacy because it values and seeks what is
impossible. On an individual level, striving to perfect ourselves causes us to amplify our
current perceived imperfections. The mistakes of the past become objects to justify our
unworthiness of love. Thus self-hatred is engendered by the perfection fallacy. On a
societal level, the effort to perfect society has a similar effect, magnifying the perceived
imperfections of that society. This magnification results in hatred for certain groups,
races, etc., who are perceived as hindering the creation of a social utopia—the creation of
a society deserving of love. Society then risks devolving into war and self-destruction,
ironically placing it further from its own unrealistic standard. When we abide by love in
the present, such an abidance does not prohibit us from working towards the social good.
Rather, when we accept that society will never be perfect, we are better able to cope with
the inevitable pitfalls involved in any social work, and we are better able to persevere in
spite of setbacks. It is not easy to practice love in the present, but such a practice
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challenges the mephitic perfection fallacy. The examination of these variform moral
tapestries illuminates the ideological strife and search for moral clarity that characterized
the 20th century.
Having introduced the moral frameworks which I will apply to The Human
Factor and Brideshead, I would like to turn to a discussion of my paper’s overarching
term, moral obligation. All of the chapters of my thesis deal with this term. Thus it is
imperative that I provide a provisional definition of this concept near the beginning of my
paper. To better articulate the focus of my thesis, I will share some of my developing
thoughts on the idea of moral obligation: Moral frameworks like the human family and
love in the present are not to be thought of as dogma. In his History of Sexuality, Michel
Foucault notes that morality need not be conveyed through a specific moral code. Morals
can be “transmitted in a diffuse manner, so that, far from constituting a systematic
ensemble, they form a complex interplay of elements that counterbalance and correct one
another” (25). The sense of moral obligation to the human family, for example, does not
require us to follow a specific set of edicts. Rather, as we think of other people in familial
terms, our perception of their humanity and of the interconnected nature of our realities is
emphasized. This “interplay of elements” prompts us to include the human family in our
moral evaluation of a given action.
In order to better define moral obligation, the notion of morality must be
distinguished from other related terms, such as ethics. Though ethics and morals are
sometimes used interchangeably, morals are more broadly applicable, whereas ethics
refer to a more specific area of action. Thus we have “business ethics” rather than
“business morals.” Other fields have their own ethical standards—medical ethics,
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academic ethics, etc. Issues arise when these fields intersect; a hospital that is run like a
business may adhere to ethical business standards, but not necessarily to ethical
healthcare standards. Furthermore, morality has a personal aspect; it arises from within
and is tied to our personal experiences. It is this subjective and somewhat opaque mode
of origination that renders morality a difficult concept to articulate. Ethics is more
conducive to codification. However, an ethical code, such as that which a state BAR
association requires of its practicing attorneys, leaves less room for individual and
exceptional circumstances; a lawyer’s ethical code does not come from within, but from
without, from powers which have not taken her situation or personal life experiences into
consideration. Ethics, then, struggles to apply to all situations. The Ten Commandments
might be considered an example of this struggle—“Honor thy father and thy mother” is
reasonable advice in some circumstances, but not in all. Ethics attempts a level of
objectivity that morality resists. I specify “attempts” because ethics still arises from
humans, and thus it is inherently subjective. Ethical codes are valuable in certain
professions and disciplines, but such codes cannot replace our sense of morality.
Like ethics, “law” is another term with which morality is sometimes associated.
While some people hold that following the law is morally admirable, it is questionable
whether following any law is inherently good. That is, abiding by the law because it is
the law is insufficient justification. To blindly follow any law without considering its
moral repercussions, assuring ourselves that because it is the law we are doing the right
thing by following it, is severely problematic. Yet, we are encouraged not to question
laws because laws are presented to us as authoritative discourse. Mikhail Bakhtin writes
that such discourse “binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade
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us internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it” (78). There is no need
for law to persuade us because it is already imbued with authority; our thoughts about the
law are irrelevant and therefore internal criticism of law is disincentivized. Unlike
morality, there is no option for us to develop our own legal compass; we either obey the
law or we break the law. One could object that laws can be changed, but while a law
exists it can only be obeyed or broken. Given the law’s presentation as authoritative
discourse, people are led to accept that disobedience of law is immoral, thus solidifying
the conflation of law and morality.
Yet morality is not law. To continue with Bakhtin’s theory, I argue that morality
arises as an internal discourse. Bakhtin describes internally persuasive discourse as the
process of our minds taking in and evaluating the discourses of others. As we evaluate
these “alien discourses” (79), our sense of self develops. Bakhtin, then, theorizes that
internally persuasive discourse shapes our consciousness. For this thesis, I will adjust
Bakhtin’s terminology by using the phrase “internal discourse” rather than internally
persuasive discourse. My concern with “internally persuasive discourse” is that it
suggests that only one side of the conversation has agency, that one side is persuading the
other(s). Internal discourse is more suggestive of an egalitarian, evaluative conversation
within oneself. A healthy internal discourse should not have the appearance of a single
orator using rhetorical techniques to persuade an audience; it should have the appearance
of a scholarly conversation among respected colleagues. Such conversations help our
consciousness grow.
I would add that our sense of morality is a part of our consciousness. Therefore,
internal discourse shapes our sense of morality. Authoritative discourse, as a part of the
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overall discursive landscape, has some impact on our sense of morality, but it is the
process of internal discourse which shapes the external stimuli into a cogent moral
scaffolding. When evaluating whether we are morally obligated to commit a particular
act, we are using the process of internal discourse to arrive at a decision.
I offer this initial exploration of morality and moral obligation as an example of
the kind of theory I will discuss in chapter one and expand upon in my chapters on The
Human Factor and Brideshead. These novels contain overarching moral dilemmas which
the protagonists seek to address. In my thesis I endeavor to (1) identify these dilemmas
and (2) identify the alternative moral frameworks which the novels present. In doing so, I
will make a small but worthwhile addition to our understanding of moral obligation in the
modern world. The moral struggles which characterized the 20th century—issues of
family, law, spirituality, loyalty, and State ideology—remain unresolved in the 21st
century. We stand before the breaking dawn, an uncertain future on the horizon, looking
to glean what insight we can from our lives and the lives that came before us, from the
works of art, literature, science, and theory that are our inheritance. Only through
continued investigation into the nature of right action can we progress as individuals and
as a society.
One of the goals of this introduction is to address why I have chosen to work with
these particular writers. While Waugh and Greene are both storied British novelists, this
correlation alone is not enough to justify their work as the focus of my thesis. Nor are the
many other parallels between their lives—from education at Oxford to their participation
in the British military—sufficient justifications in themselves. I propose, rather, that these
authors present uniquely complex portrayals of moral obligation in their works, and that
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analyzing their works in concert prompts insights into these portrayals that studying them
alone cannot. Both Waugh and Greene lived through WWI and WWII. They were acutely
aware that the moral ethos of the twentieth century had failed in some respect, or in many
respects. In a 1938 letter to The New Statesman, Waugh warned against the spread of
fascism and the possibility that fascism could rise in England (“5 March 1938”). Though
Waugh’s conflation of fascism and socialism in the article is misguided, his concern for
English society is genuine. Likewise, Greene said in a 1980 interview that “what is
happening in the world at present impairs any serenity I may have acquired. I believe—
without being totally convinced—that we’re heading for a Third World War; that at all
events we’re going through a very dangerous time” (Allain 183). Greene, like Waugh,
recognized that we have become ensconced in a moral opacity which, on the individual
level, has fostered depression and anger, hindering the love and sense of purpose which
we need to find happiness and meaning in life. And, on the societal level, the faulty
compass has engendered war, mass paranoia, dehumanization, and hatred of the Other.
Technological advances have improved some aspects of our lives, but technology is not a
panacea. The veneer of civilization can easily crumble with the press of a button, the
entry of a launch code, an insult given in jest but taken in earnest. To get to the heart of
the matter, humans must address the moral strife which pervades the modern world. Both
Greene and Waugh recognized this necessity and responded by seeking clarity in the
spiritual. The two authors chose to convert to Catholicism in their 20s. Greene converted
in February 1926 (Sherry 263-65), and Waugh converted in September 1930 (Patey 35). I
will investigate the reasoning behind each author’s conversion separately and then
compare them.
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One of the popular narratives about Greene’s conversion is that he chose to do so
in order to marry his Catholic fiancé Vivien Dayrell-Browning. In The Quest for Graham
Greene: A Biography, W.J. West notes that no rule existed in the Catholic Church that
required one’s conversion in order to marry a Catholic (4). Thus the conversion-as-anecessity-for-marriage narrative is dubious. Nor would that narrative answer why Greene
remained a Catholic after separating from Vivien in 1947. It is worth looking more
deeply into Greene’s reasoning. West traces elements of Catholic sympathy to earlier in
Greene’s life. For example, in a formal debate at Berkhamsted in February 1921, Greene
“made an impassioned contribution on the situation in Ireland” (6). That is, Greene
supported Ireland in the Irish War of Independence, a controversial stance in England at
the time. The Irish War of Independence was viewed not only as a political war but also
as a war between Catholics and Protestants; the War was an attempt to fight both political
and religious oppression. For Greene, then, Catholicism was intertwined with politics.
Greene’s dislike of religious oppression later superseded his support for Ireland and IRA,
the latter of whom Greene claimed were terrorizing Catholics and Protestants alike (6).
Religio-moral concerns took precedence over Greene’s loyalty to his State or to any
State.
Along with the political, there was also a psycho-spiritual component to Greene’s
decision to convert. As a youth, Greene suffered from severe bouts of depression. In his
autobiography A Sort of Life, Greene recalls his suicidal ideations and his obsession with
his brother’s pistol, which he once put to his temple and fired, knowing there was one
bullet somewhere in the chamber. While he refers to this act of Russian roulette as
“semisuicidal” (130), the “semi” is questionable, and his act is certainly emblematic of
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his deep mental health issues. Poor mental health has been asserted as one of the byproducts engendered by modern society. In “Anomie in the Metropolis,” Hans Pols
describes modern society as having created a sense of anomie among people (198).
Anomie is a feeling of dispossession, a breaking down of the traditional structure and
moral standards of a society. Given the disturbing world of Berkhamstead School—
which Greene described as “a hundred and four weeks of monotony, humiliation, and
mental pain” (A Sort of Life 88)—followed by the incongruous mix of freedom and
pressure to succeed at Oxford, it is quite likely that some of Greene’s inner conflicts
derived from anomie. Through spirituality, Greene found some relief from his
psychological struggles. In an interview, Greene credits Catholicism with having
positively affected his mental health: “I don’t mean in terms of professional success or in
terms of money, but in terms of happiness” (qtd. in Allain 164). While happiness is a
difficult feeling to gauge, the fact that Greene perceived some spiritual and psychological
solace in his religion indicates a motive for conversion other than marriage.
I should be clear that Greene did not convert from Protestantism to Catholicism;
he converted from atheism to Catholicism. In The Life of Graham Greene: Vol. 1,
Norman Sherry notes that, though Greene had a Protestant upbringing, this religion did
not resonate with him (254). By the time he went to Oxford, Greene identified as an
atheist. Indeed, he was recognized for his skilled arguments in favor of atheism. Robin
Turton, a classmate of Greene’s at Oxford, wrote, “I think in my life I’ve never heard
atheism put forward better than by Graham” (qtd. in Sherry 127). It might be tempting to
dismiss Greene’s atheism as a youthful phase, but his knowledge of atheist rhetoric
indicates that Greene took this ideology seriously. Conversely, Greene’s avidity for
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atheism demonstrates a continued interest in matters of religion. He could not have so
effectively posed his arguments without possessing a thorough understanding of the
opposing, pro-religious arguments. I will suggest that, in debating his colleagues, Greene
was also debating himself. The search for meaning and moral clarity in life requires some
inner dialogue. Greene chose to convert to Catholicism because, after considerable
deliberation, he concluded that from Catholicism he had a greater chance of deriving
political, moral, and spiritual meaning. To characterize Greene’s conversion as a
pragmatic means of marriage facilitation belies earlier evidence of Catholic and spiritual
interests.
As with Greene, the popular narratives regarding Waugh’s conversion are
problematic. Waugh is sometimes characterized as having converted to Catholicism from
a state of unthinking hedonism. It is true that Waugh had his youthful revels. In The Life
of Evelyn Waugh, Douglas Patey notes that Waugh’s years at Oxford were not
particularly productive from an academic standpoint; he spent much of his time in
socializing, drinking, and sexual experimentation (9-16). This mode did not change after
leaving Oxford. Patey describes Waugh’s 20s as “an aimless round of occasional
employment, parties in London, weekend trips back to Oxford…afternoons whiled away
in the cinema, and, throughout, drunkenness” (16). Many of these epicurean elements are
reflected in Waugh’s first major novel, Decline and Fall, which was published before his
conversion. The novel’s protagonist, the hapless Paul Pennyfeather, is expelled from
Scone College, Oxford due to the debauches of his colleagues. His only recourse is to
live as a teacher among incompetent, uncaring faculty at a boys’ school. Paul is
eventually engaged to the wealthy, widowed mother of one of his students—the
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Honorable Mrs. Margot Beste-Chetwynde—not knowing that her wealth comes from
South American brothels (Decline and Fall 167). Decline and Fall is a biting satire of
modern British culture. Simon Heffer refers to the novel as “an orgy of bad taste.” Thus,
based on his early writing and his early escapades, a common narrative about Waugh is
that he had no religious interest prior to his conversion. Yet, Waugh himself was not
exactly promoting the irreverence of his times. Rather, his seemingly atheistic work
reflects Waugh’s own internal dialogue with spiritual concerns. He was observing that a
life such as Paul or Margot’s would not yield satisfaction or moral clarity which he
desired. Even Waugh’s revels can be viewed as a means of taking in external information
which he would subsequently evaluate. Some of his drinking partners included
philosophers and theologians, such as the intellectual John Betjeman (Patey 38). Two
years after Decline and Fall’s publication, Waugh officially converted to Catholicism
(35).
By 1930, Waugh had become a celebrity, and his conversion was widely
publicized by newspapers and tabloids, such as the Daily Express (35). Waugh himself
participated in various articles and interviews, with titles such as “My Conversion to
Rome, by Evelyn Waugh, the Young Novelist, A Striking Article, See Page 10 Today”
(35). In these interviews, Waugh remained vague and general about conversion, and
some of Waugh’s contemporaries suggested that he converted for mere aesthetic
attraction, or for youthful contrarianism (37). The publicity-stunt impression of Waugh’s
conversion masked the underlying reasons behind his decision. This obfuscation was
likely deliberate on Waugh’s part. A man of his time, Waugh would have been
uncomfortable showing any true vulnerability. Yet, behind the theatrical facade, Waugh
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did have deeper reasons for his conversion. As with Greene, Waugh’s conversion was not
a spur of the moment decision, but a gradual exploration of spirituality, politics, religion,
atheism, and other ideologies. Two of Waugh’s colleagues at Oxford, Alastair Graham
and Christopher Hollis, were Catholic converts. In a diary entry, Waugh wrote about a
night with these two friends in which “We got drunk in the evening and argued about
foreigners and absolution” (qtd. in Patey 38). Their drunkenness allowed these upperclass British gentleman some degree of safety to express their views about religion and
society. One could argue that alcohol was a necessary facilitator of Waugh’s until
intellectual and moral growth. During his 20s Waugh was attempting to understand the
moral confusion that he observed both in himself and in society. In a 1924 letter to
Dudley Carew, Waugh writes “As to Oxford and myself. I cannot yet explain all the
things that are about me” (qtd. in Amory 13): Waugh is examining both himself and his
society, or at least the slice of society that exists at Oxford. Waugh is examining both his
internal discourse and the external discourses which surround him. Though Waugh’s
internal discourse is still in turbulence, the word “yet” indicates that he is searching and
that he intends to continue searching for a viable moral framework by which to live his
life.
The characters in Decline and Fall reflect this moral fog. Paul Pennyfeather does
take the blame for Margot’s human trafficking, but he does not make the decision out of
strong moral conviction; he is not a Christ-like figure of sacrifice. Pennyfeather
acquiesces out of a vaguely chivalristic sentiment, a confused sense of what it means to
be an English gentleman (Decline and Fall 180-81). Such sentiment neither improves
society nor Pennyfeather’s own psyche. The novel finishes where it began, with Paul
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back at Scone College, having learned nothing and gained nothing (236-39). Waugh
himself did not want to live out a life of cyclical meaninglessness. And, like many British
people of his time, Waugh anticipated the next world war: in a 1931 letter to Henry
Yorke, Waugh wrote of a conversation he had with a priest in which they talked about
war—“sometimes the last one and sometimes the next” (qtd. in Amory 55). The next war
would mark a continuation of a cyclical struggle which, given that WWI solved little if
anything, seemed unlikely to promise any concrete progress. Indeed, the cyclic nature of
modern society is less a cycle and more of a downward spiral; humanity cannot survive
many more world wars. By converting to Catholicism, Waugh felt he would gain the
moral clarity that he lacked as an agnostic; reflecting on his conversion later in life,
Waugh wrote that his life had become “unintelligible and unendurable without God”
(“Come Inside” 20). The idea that the world was unintelligible to Waugh indicates that he
was unable to derive any meaning from the external discourses around him and the
internal discourses within him. Without a religious component, society, including the
moral landscape of society, was opaque. Waugh’s conversion was an effort to find some
moral intelligibility in the world. And he did not want moral intelligibility for himself
alone. By advertising his conversion, Waugh hoped to spur others to convert as well,
thereby promoting a more morally sustainable society.
The notion of Greene and Waugh’s conversion, and of religious conversion in
general, can be further articulated by examining scholarship related to the theory of
conversion. Scholarship on religious conversion is multidisciplinary, and includes
psychology, philosophy, and religious criticism. I will begin with an evaluation of
conversion from a psychological perspective. In The Varieties of Religious Experience,
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William James offers a preliminary definition of conversion:
To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience
religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the
process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and
consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously
right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious
realities. (186)
James’s understanding of religious conversion is fairly positive. That is, James views
conversion as a beneficial experience for an individual’s psyche. People who feel deep
inner conflicts—feelings of meaninglessness or personal insignificance, nihilism,
existential longing, coetaneous desires for incompatible conditions—have the potential to
resolve those conflicts through religious conversion. James suggests that, through
conversion, individuals become happier. If we assume happiness as a generally good and
desirable condition, then religious conversion is a generally good and desirable process.
However, James is not necessarily claiming that God or the divine exists. Nor is he
claiming that conversion is a direct product of God’s influence. Conversion is a
psychological process in which an individual perceives or interprets a divine influence.
Whether or not God actually exists, the experience of conversion is beneficial to the
individual’s psyche. James cites several examples of patients who improved their mental
health through conversion (186-90), and there is evidence that Greene and Waugh gained
some clarity and mental relief from conversion as well: While both authors continued to
have psychological struggles throughout their lives, Greene never again attempted
suicide, by Russian roulette or otherwise. Likewise, Waugh found the strength to
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continue writing despite his alcoholism and other health problems, and he produced
sixteen novels and many nonfiction works during his life. In a letter to Edith Sitwell,
Waugh once wrote, “I know I am awful. But how much more awful I should be without
the Faith” (qtd. in Amory 451). While Waugh is well aware of his flaws, it is evident that
he derives psychological support from his religious convictions.
Furthermore, both novelists regarded Catholicism as an artistic muse. A number
of scholars, such as Earle Coleman and Ernest Rubinstein, have focused on the parallels
between art and religion, without arguing for a causal relationship between one and the
other. However, a causal relationship between religious conversion and artistic creativity
is not unthinkable. In Graham Greene’s Catholic Imagination, Mark Bosco argues that
Catholicism is “an imaginative ground from which Greene's creativity draws inspiration”
(4). A similar claim can be made for Waugh’s relationship with Catholicism, and for
many artists’ relationships with religion; religious conversion creates a space of clarity in
which the imagination can flourish. Many cultures attribute artistic creativity to the
divine. The ancient Greeks imparted different genres of art upon different Muses. An epic
poet might proffer an offering to Calliope, a lyric poet to Terpsichore (Hard 48-49). The
gods could then inspire creativity within the artist. Whether or not the gods exist outside
of the artist’s mind, through religious devotion the artist would feel the moral and
existential clarity necessary to pursue her endeavors with renewed confidence.
The notion of conversion as a catalyst for artistic productivity relates to James’s
characterization of conversion as a regenerative process (186). To write a novel is to
generate a world with new possibilities and moral landscapes. Writing is a product of
internal discourse; the conversations within the writer’s mind are rendered in an external
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form, on the page. Given that conversion is a form of internal discourse, the generative
process of writing can function as an aspect of one’s conversion; writing can bring the
author closer to the unity to which James refers. Greene and Waugh’s initial conversion,
then, is a generative force which facilitates future conversions through writing. Such a
depiction does not contradict with James’s understanding of conversion—James notes
that conversion can be a “gradual or sudden” process. While some people do undergo
sudden spiritual transformations, the idea of conversion as an ongoing experience accords
with Greene and Waugh’s ongoing literary endeavors. Many of these endeavors, such as
Greene’s The Heart of the Matter and Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited, include the search
for spiritual clarity as an important theme.
This gradual mode of conversion is better illuminated by examining Rambo’s
narrative theory. In “Theories of Conversion: Understanding and Interpreting Religious
Change,” Lewis Rambo describes narrative theory as a means of understanding
conversion through the inner stories we construct about our lives. Conversion is an
integration of spirituality into our psychological narratives. Constructing new narratives
gives “new meaning to a person’s definition of self, identity, relationships, and God”
(265). One cannot convert from atheism to Catholicism without rewriting one’s internal
biography. Memories which were absent of a spiritual element become imbued with the
divine. For example, one’s memory of a pleasant hike through a peaceful forest is
reframed as a pleasant hike through one of God’s beautiful creations. The blooming of a
cherry tree in spring, the death of a family member, the moral standing of a given
situation, all are rewritten. Writers construct the narratives of their lives, in part, through
the works that they produce. I would argue that even the writing of fictional works
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constitutes an effort to reimagine or develop our inner narrative. If we accept this
premise, and accept the premise that conversion is a form of narrative construction, then
the writing of novels can constitute a part of one’s conversion experience.
A related theory of conversion which Rambo details is identity theory—defined
as the idea that conversion is an identity-forming experience (265). Identity theory takes
into consideration the complexity of the modern world, which has promoted the
fragmentation of
people’s identities. The variety of people with whom we must interact, and the variety of
contexts in which we must interact with people, necessitates the creation of subidentities; our sub-identity while speaking with a bank teller is different from our subidentity while interacting with a grocer, an engineer, a vacuum-cleaner salesman, etc.
Likewise, we are also exposed to a surfeit of information. Newspapers, radio, film,
photography, and eventually the internet create a daunting mass of data to which our
identities are exposed. Urbanization and industrialization foster alien landscapes which
imbue the individual with a sense of anonymity, disconnection, and insignificance. The
sense of community which was more common in the preindustrial era, common in part
due to the necessity of communities for people’s survival, becomes difficult to acquire.
This lack of community also fragments our identities. Conversion, then, acts as a means
of establishing and maintaining a more stable identity in the harsh conditions of the
modern world. Identity theory “provides a framework within which to understand
people’s need for convictions and values that consolidate understandings of the self”
(265). Among these values is morality. Conversion subverts the amoral, nihilistic
tendencies of modernity by prompting us to think deeply about our place and purpose in
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the world, and by facilitating a spiritual connection which links us not only to the divine
but to other people and to the planet as a whole. When we feel connected to others, we
are more likely to feel a moral obligation toward others. Moral clarity cannot thrive when
our identities are fragmented and dissevered from the world. Thus conversion is a catalyst
for moral development. James’s assertion that conversion creates a “unified” psyche
coheres with the notion of identity theory (James186), as identity theory seeks to explain
how conversion can solder the fragments of our psyches into a more unified form.
As I have agreed with James that conversion can be gradual, I would further argue
that unification is not a binary with disunity, that there are degrees of unification. Full
unification of the psyche cannot be achieved, at least in our human forms. We can,
however, work toward identity unification through conversion processes like the
construction of narratives. There are also degrees of fragmentation, and new events in our
lives can exacerbate psychological dissociations. For example, when we lose a job and
become unemployed, a part of our identity is lost. The loss of one part affects the whole
psyche; our neural architecture is missing a buttress, destabilizing the entire structure. We
may feel especially fragmented when our job is replaced by a machine; modernity creates
the sense of human obsolescence. We become machines competing with other machines
within a larger mechanical system; our humanity is elided. A machine does not feel a
moral obligation towards another machine. In order to compete in a mechanized culture,
we may feel the need to stifle our own moral senses. Thus industrialization acts as a
centrifugal force, pushing our psyches outward into various unstable compartments.
Conversion acts as a centripetal force, providing an inward push toward psychological
unification in a world which compels our identities outward into various unstable sub-
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identities, including our employment identities. Our psyches are always in flux, moving
somewhere along the fragmentation-unification spectrum. But modern life has upset the
dynamic, giving the centrifugal forces of fragmentation an advantage. Conversion creates
an individual and social counterpoint, promoting mental stability and moral clarity.
Not all theorists have taken as positive a view of conversion as James. In
“Religious Conversion, Self-Deception, and Pascal’s Wager,” Ward Jones suggests that
some forms of conversion constitute acts of self-deception, including conversion based
on Pascal’s Wager (167). Pascal invites people to convert to Christianity through his
famous Wager. If God exists and we choose to believe in God, we will go to heaven. If
God does not exist and we choose to believe in God, we will not be affected either way.
Therefore, belief in God is the only rational choice. Why risk going to Hell by not
believing in God? Atheists should convert as conversion cannot possibly harm them and
may result in their salvation. On the surface, the Wager seems reasonable, but on closer
examination there are flaws in Pascal’s ideology. Jones argues that “the Wager itself
ignores the epistemic side of belief. The Wager ignores, that is, whether we have any
support for the proposition that God exists” (172). In other words, Pascal’s Wager does
not justify the value of believing in God by providing sufficient evidence that God exists,
or that it is reasonably likely that He exists. If there is insufficient evidence to support the
existence of God, then belief in God is pointless; we are not at risk of going to hell, nor is
there a possibility of going to heaven. Indeed, belief is more than pointless, it is delusive,
and therefore it is harmful to our mental faculties. Pascal’s Wager must assume that there
is some evidence that God exists, but an unsupported assumption is at best a guess. A
wager is not a wager if there is no chance of winning or losing. If the Wager is a mere
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guess, then we are just as likely to go to Heaven by believing in and praying to a large
sentient turtle; the turtle may or may not control the fate of our souls, but it is best to
believe in the turtle just in case. As this example demonstrates, a Pascalian syllogism is
insufficient evidence on which to base one’s faith.
Converting due to Pascal’s logic will not provide the kind of unifying,
regenerative quality to which James refers. While religious conversion based on
Pascalian reasoning may constitute a form of self-deception, it is unlikely that such
reasoning was an aspect of Greene or Waugh’s conversion. I have argued that both
authors converted not only to generate personal clarity, but to promote social clarity as
well. Pascal’s Wager does nothing to help society; it is focused on what happens to our
souls after death. We may be comforted by the thought that we have invested in some
afterlife insurance policy, but such a policy does not affect our sense of moral obligation.
Such a policy will not prevent another world war. In an interview later in his life, Greene
was asked if he is afraid of hell. He replied, “No: I don’t believe in it. I believe rather in a
sort of purgatory” (Allain 21). Unlike hell, purgatory allows for the chance of selfimprovement. In purgatory, we can work toward redemption. Waugh’s emphasis on
purgatory was comparable to Greene’s; in a letter to John Betjeman, he wrote “We all
have to become saints before we get to heaven. That is what purgatory is for” (qtd. in
Amory 339). One of the premises of Pascal’s Wager is that, if God exists, we can either
believe and go to heaven, or disbelieve and go to hell—the possibility of purgatory, of a
productive period where we work toward heaven, is not accounted for. In Catholicism,
our authors found a means of personal and social improvement. If we have only to take
the Wager and accept that God exists, improvement is unnecessary. We could potentially
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commit immoral acts, such as murder—or, on a broader scope, war and genocide—and
comfort ourselves that we are going to heaven (or, at least, that we are not going to hell)
because we have accepted the Wager. Conversion for Pascalian reasoning will not
ameliorate the systemic issues of the modern era; amorality, narcissism, nihilism,
dehumanization, etc. Conversion based on more sound reasoning such as the
aforementioned identity and narrative theories has the potential to rectify the personal and
social pitfalls that we experience in the modern world. I do not intend to portray
conversion as a panacea, nor do I think that Waugh or Greene viewed conversion in this
way. These authors did believe that conversion could have a positive impact on the
internal discourse of the individual and on the moral sustainability of modern society.
However, it is not necessary to view all forms of conversion as inherently good, given
that certain conversion theories, such as the Wager, are certainly problematic.
The problems associated with acceptance of the Wager do not apply to all forms
of conversion, but some scholars have suggested that conversion of any kind entails a
loss of individual agency: In “Merton’s ‘True Self’: Moral Autonomy and Religious
Conversion,” Walter Conn explores the relationship between “moral autonomy and
religious surrender” (513). Conn asks, how can we have moral autonomy if we submit to
religious conversion? The notion of conversion as a form of submission is curious.
Submission implies a reduction of agency. Yet, in my earlier assessment of conversion, I
characterized it as a conscious choice. More so, if the choice to convert is a gradual
process, then one is repeatedly making a choice to proceed along the path of conversion.
The suggestion that through conversion one is submitting, that one is giving up one’s
agency, belies the self-will requisite in most conversion experiences. There are situations
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where one might be forced to convert by social pressure or even forced to convert at
gunpoint. Furthermore, some people do experience an instantaneous, epiphany-like
conversion which seems to require no self-will. Thus I cannot claim that all conversion
experiences require self-discipline and individual agency, but the opposing conception of
all conversions as a loss of autonomy is definitely suspect.
Conn employs Thomas Merton’s writings on conversion to address the issue of
conversion as a loss of autonomy. Conn attempts to resolve the moral autonomy/religious
surrender dynamic by positing that “genuine religious surrender…denies not…moral
autonomy but only the illusion of its absoluteness” (514). In other words, we can have
moral autonomy whether we are converted or not, but our sense of morality is never
absolute or objective. If no moral framework is completely objective, then all moral
viewpoints require some degree of internal evaluation, and therefore moral culpability
still lies with the individual. Even if we adopt a particular moral framework, such as
Catholicism, we will still have to make subjective moral decisions, and these decisions
imply some moral autonomy on the individual level.
Furthermore, the dilemma between moral agency and conversion is not actually a
dilemma because moral agency cannot be broken down into a binary in which we are
either autonomous or submissive. We can never have complete autonomy in our moral
decisions because we live in a society in which various external ideologies are constantly
vying for our attention. When we practice internal discourse, we are evaluating data
gathered from others, from the external world. Though internal discourse occurs within
our minds, there is always an external component, and we will never have full control
over the external world. Waugh and Greene adopted a religion that was already present in
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the external world, but both authors evaluated aspects of Catholicism and internally
altered certain beliefs in order to have an ideology that was more morally suitable to
them—Greene’s disbelief in the concept of hell is an example of these internal
alterations. Thus, moral autonomy is still possible even in a religion with an extensive
external history, such as Catholicism. To adopt a religious ideology entails no more a loss
of autonomy than to adopt an atheistic or capitalistic ideology. With any ideology, we can
still choose to practice internal discourse.
Indeed, for some individuals, submission to a moral framework garners greater
agency, because the framework promotes mental clarity. Psychological and moral clarity
necessitates more than an avowal of submission. As with some of our aforementioned
theorists, Conn characterizes conversion, or at least the kind of conversion necessary to
increase our moral agency, as a gradual process. To exemplify this process, Conn cites
the conversion of Thomas Merton: “Merton’s development was slow, and at times
extremely painful, but the roots went deep and laid a sound support system…” (515).
Over time, through prayer, study, meditation, and internal discourse, Merton gained a
more stable psychological state. Merton’s conversion did not yield the discovery of moral
absolutes, but it did yield moral agency—the ability to assess given situations and choose
morally sound actions in response to those situations. Like our authors, Merton’s
conversion also engendered considerable creativity; he published over sixty book-length
works in his lifetime, including biographies, autobiographies, works of religious
criticism, comparative religion, mysticism, journals, poetry collections, and novels.
In our discussion of conversion theories, it is worth noting that some scholars
have studied the idea of conversion from an antipodal angle. Streib and Keller describe

24
deconversion theory as a relatively new field, marked by a variety of related terms, such
as “apostacy, defection, disaffiliation, falling from faith,” etc. (182). Deconversion is
prompted by various factors, including moral scruples (183). People who have
deconverted cite their concerns about the moral rightness of their former religion. They
feel that their religion and their morality have fallen out of alignment. For example, we
might learn more about our religion’s dogmas and begin to disagree with those dogmas,
eventually to such an extent that we decide to deconvert. Or, our sense of morality may
simply develop to a point where it is no longer compatible with the moral teachings of
our religion. Yet, dogma is not the only aspect of a religion’s morality. Another person
might be so appalled by a scandal within his church—such as the Catholic priest sex
abuse scandal—that he feels compelled to leave. Though Catholic dogma has not
changed, the moral standing of the Church has been compromised, at least in the eyes of
the deconvert. A religion’s moral teachings seem hypocritical if they are not actually
practiced.
Strain and Keller also cite “intellectual doubt” as a reason for deconversion (183).
People begin to consider or reconsider the veracity of their religious beliefs. In those
individuals who seek to gather information and evaluate it intellectually, internal
discourse can prompt religious skepticism. After all, there are possible objections that can
be made to any religion or moral philosophy. Still, intellectual doubt does not necessarily
engender deconversion. St. Augustine experienced considerable doubts during his
conversion experience: “I should have knocked and proposed the doubt, how it was to be
believed, not insultingly opposed it, as if believed. Doubt, then, what to hold for certain,
the more sharply gnawed my heart…So I was confounded, and converted” (Augustine
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86). The juxtaposition of the states of being confounded and converted is curious. That
Augustine is confounded demonstrates that he still has doubts to work through, even after
his conversion. One might even argue that the intensity of Augustine’s doubts spurred his
conversion; he felt compelled to engage in an inner dialogue, an internal discourse
between skepticism and religious conviction. Augustine was educated in philosophy and
theology, and his doubts had intellectual roots in skeptic philosophers like Cicero and
Pyrrho (Watson 48). In “‘I Doubt, Therefore I Am’: St. Augustine and Skepticism,”
Gerard Watson suggests that “Augustine saw life as a journey on a stormy sea: he
obviously wished at times for the enviable complacency of Pyrrho’s pig which ate
steadily through the storm” (48). Pyrrho asked his followers to envision a pig who
continues placidly eating while aboard a ship in a stormy sea (Watson 44). It is on this
pig that Pyrrho thought humans should model their lives. On one hand, the pig is
admirable because he does not worry about the things which are outside of his control.
On the other hand, the pig is not admirable because he does not have the spirit of inquiry
which drives us to seek meaning in the storm. Pyrrho misjudges the intelligence of pigs,
but for the sake of Pyrrho’s argument we can imagine a particularly dull, uninquisitive
pig. Augustine, as with most people, could never be like the pig; he could never be
entirely doubtless, entirely unshaken by the storm of discourses around him and within
his own mind. Yet, from the time of his initial conversion at the age of 31, Augustine
retained his belief in Christianity. He still experienced doubts, but he did not deconvert;
the very storm from which arises skepticism is the same storm from which arises faith.
Greene’s intellectual doubt, somewhat paradoxically, seemed to strengthen his
faith. Greene chose St. Thomas the Apostle, also known as St. Thomas the Doubter, as
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the saint under which he converted (Sherry 254). When Jesus was resurrected after three
days in his tomb, Thomas was nonplussed—a reasonable reaction given the
circumstances. Resurrection defies the laws of nature, and Thomas was not able to accept
that Jesus had risen from the dead without further evidence. Jesus invited Thomas to
touch his hands and look at the holes where the nails had been (The Bible, John 20.2429). Thomas’s doubt spurred him to further investigation, as I think Greene’s doubt did
for him. The tactile and visual evidence proved sufficient to alleviate Thomas’s
intellectual scruples, but such evidence is not available to modern converts. Though in
1926 Greene was ready to convert, he could not relinquish his intellectual doubt. Greene
felt an affinity for St. Thomas, an apostle who was misunderstood and even vilified by
Christians for his lack of faith. The story of St. Thomas demonstrated to Greene that
doubt could act as a catalyst for intellectual and spiritual inquiry, deepening our
appreciation for religion without giving up our skeptic’s lens.
Waugh, too, experienced doubts about the Church. In Evelyn Waugh: A
Biography, Christopher Sykes notes that Waugh lamented the Catholic Church’s
movements of reform during the 1950s; such changes included allowing the Easter
celebration to take place on Saturday night in addition to Sunday morning (381-82).
While this shift may seem inconsequential, Waugh felt that the symbolism of Easter as a
renewal was diminished. The reforms culminated with the changes of Vatican II in 1962.
In a letter to Diana Mosley, Waugh wrote, “The Vatican Council has knocked the guts
out of me” (qtd. in Amory 638). While Waugh experienced doubts about the Church and
specifically about the infallibility of the pope, he remained a devout Catholic. Indeed,
Waugh’s writing about the Church became more prolific during this time, publishing
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articles such as “The Same Again, Please” in The Spectator. Waugh chose to use his
doubts as a catalyst for further investigation of his faith. It may seem intuitive to consider
doubt as a detrimental quality to religious faith, but doubt is a necessary component of
some people’s religious faith.
Religious conversion is gradual, but it is not necessarily a linear process. Our
study of deconversion theory demonstrates that a developing moral sense can just as
readily challenge our faith as reinforce it. While neither Greene nor Waugh ever
deconverted from their Catholic affiliation once they officially converted, it is evident
that both experienced periods of moral concern and intellectual doubt. Deconversion,
then, need not be considered the binary opposite of conversion. Rather, both terms exist
on a spectrum in which internal discourse takes place and moral values are formed and
reformed.
Although the depiction of doubt as a quality coexisting with faith is sensible, it is
nonetheless a problematic definition because some religions and religious figures view
doubt as sinful or transgressive. For example, Cardinal John Henry Newman
characterized doubt as a product of people’s inadequacies: In his lecture “Faith in the
Catholic Church,” he extolls, “I tell you, that it is no difficult thing for a Catholic to
believe; and unless he grievously mismanages himself, the difficult thing is for him to
doubt” (Newman 268). According to Newman, doubt, of any degree, is unnatural. It is
easy to have faith, and therefore someone who struggles with faith must have some
personal inadequacy. Compounding matters, doubt is not a product of external forces but
a self-inflicted condition, as is indicated by the phrasing, “he grievously mismanages
himself.” Cardinal Newman views doubt as a willful, and sinful, act. One could argue
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that any sin requires some self-will and therefore Newman must portray doubt as willful
in order to simultaneously portray doubt as a sin. At any rate, Newman is engendering
self-blame and even self-loathing in Catholics who experience doubt. Perhaps inducing
self-loathing will goad some doubters to doubtlessness. Others, however, will feel
ostracized and pushed toward deconversion. I suggest that Newman, and other figures
who argue that doubt is sinful, cling to the immediate (and permanent) conception of
conversion and do not regard a gradual conversion as possible or morally permissible.
Though the immediate conception of conversion may work for some converts, to
elide or condemn the possibility of a gradual mode severely limits the scope of
conversion as a concept. One of Friedrich Nietzsche’s major criticisms of Christianity
was that it portrayed doubt as a sin: “One is supposed to be cast into belief without
reason, by a miracle, and from then swim in it as in the brightest and least ambiguous of
elements: even a glance towards land, even the thought that one perhaps exists for
something else as well as swimming, even the slightest impulse of our amphibious
nature—is sin!” (Nietzsche 89). Nietzsche’s aquatic animal metaphor emphasizes the
impracticability of blind faith, of belief “without reason.” Even a fish will occasionally
gaze toward land, how much more so a human? Humans are meant to have doubts, our
brains have the capacity for internal and it would be inhuman to stifle our internal
investigations. Like Newman, Nietzsche is focusing on the immediate concept of
conversion, without granting the possibility any extended dynamic of doubt and internal
discourse. Nietzsche is critical of the idea that conversion can occur as an instantaneous,
miracle-like event—a miracle which does not have any prior logic leading up to it. I
suspect that such conversions make up only a small portion of the conversive landscape.
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For Greene and Waugh, internal discourse was an integral aspect of their conversion
experiences. Like Saint Thomas the Doubter, like Augustine, like many people, these
authors could not be the unquestioning believer, they could not be Pyrrho’s pig. But they
were still Catholics.
Having assessed various scholars’ conceptions of conversion, it is reasonable to
conclude that conversion is a variform term. There is no one accepted idea of conversion.
However, when considering the conversions of Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh, a
gradual notion of conversion is most applicable. Though there was an exact point where
Greene and Waugh “officially” converted—February 1926 and September 1930,
respectively—both were thinking about issues of religion and spirituality long before that
point. Indeed, the spiritual and moral compasses of these authors continued to evolve
throughout their lives. I do not think that either author ever reached a point where he was
fully converted because neither author ever stopped practicing internal discourse.
Morality, like conversion, cannot be reduced to a simple act of acceptance. Nor is there a
universal morality, an absolute morality. The reason that I have chosen to study the work
of Greene and Waugh in one thesis is that both authors deeply explored issues of morality
in their lives and works. Furthermore, Greene’s The Human Factor and Waugh’s
Brideshead Revisited, when studied in concert, reveal aspects of moral obligation that
would not be apparent if studied alone. Our exploration of conversion theories sets an
important groundwork for this essay’s continued study of moral obligation. The
following chapter will explicate the key terms and theories which I will employ to argue
my thesis.
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Chapter 1—
The Morality Spectrum: Defining and Interrogating Moral Theories
While I have given some provisional definitions of my key terms in the
introduction, it is now time to delve deeper into the major theoretical concepts of this
paper. Specifically, I intend to elaborate on the concepts of moral obligation, the human
family, gamification, love in the present, and the perfection fallacy. Throughout, I will
use Bakhtin’s concept of internal discourse to place the above terms into an overarching
theoretical lens. We will continue to reexamine these terms in chapters two and three as I
apply them to The Human Factor and Brideshead Revisited, but chapter one will provide
the groundwork from which future analysis will be based. The first term on which I will
elaborate is moral obligation.
In the introduction, I identified some important characteristics of morality—that
(1) morality has both a personal and social component, that (2) morality is resistant to
codification, that (3) we can never have absolute moral autonomy, and that (4) our sense
of moral obligation is developed through internal discourse. I also distinguished morality
from other related terms, including ethics and law. However, I have not yet distinguished
morality from immorality. An exploration of this dynamic is a good place to start. What
does it mean to be immoral or to commit an immoral act? Basic definitions of immoral
tend to either be tautological—e.g., “not moral”—or they are overly vague—e.g.,
“conflicting with generally or traditionally held moral principles” (“Immoral”). While the
second definition attributes a social element to immorality, it does not include a personal
element. Furthermore, the notion that immorality transgresses moral principles which are
“generally or traditionally held,” ignores the possibility that the majority’s view of
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morality is itself immoral. An example of a traditionally and once widely held moral
principle is that white people are superior to other groups; therefore, white people are
morally obligated to colonize and civilize these other groups. Consider Rudyard
Kipling’s influential poem, “The White Man’s Burden.” Kipling makes a moral
argument, calling upon the U.S. to tame the native communities in their newly acquired
territories. The U.S. must civilize their “new-caught, sullen peoples/ Half-devil and halfchild.” The description of the invaded people as devil-like adds to Kipling’s moral
argument; it would be immoral to let the devil have these people. Likewise, Kipling’s
description of the invaded people as child-like evokes a moral necessity; it would be
immoral to leave these children alone in the woods to fend for themselves. Though this
poem was published in 1899, the ideology of colonialism as a morally justified practice
existed as early as the 1500s. In the 16th century, a politician who argued against
colonialism was likely to be vilified as immoral and un-Christian. Yet, our hypothetical
politician does not necessarily seem immoral to the modern reader. Given the
changeability and subjectivity of generally held beliefs, the transgression of a traditional
or generally held moral principle is not an adequate definition of immorality.
The notion of traditionally held moral principles also recalls Bakhtin’s concept of
authoritative discourse rather than internal discourse. A traditional moral principle exists
prior to our birth, prior to the development of our consciousness. The authority of the
principle derives not from the principle’s moral soundness but from the traditional
acceptance of the principle as authoritative discourse. Authoritative discourse discourages
its adherents to think critically or to recognize that critical evaluation of the discourse is
even possible. While for Bakhtin all discourses are dialogic, authoritative discourse
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presents itself as monologic. Bakhtin adds that authoritative discourse “permits no play
with its framing context” (The Dialogic Imagination 424). We must either accept or
reject the discourse, and anyone who rejects it, such as our 1600s politician, is labelled
immoral.
I propose a definition of immorality that focuses on internal discourse rather than
a majority-rule or authoritative definition: An immoral act is an act which, when
subjected to internal discourse, cannot be sufficiently justified. Immorality occupies the
lower end of a spectrum, with morality occupying the other end. Internal discourse will
reveal the relative merits or demerits of the act being considered, and internal discourse
will reveal the degree to which the actor has succeeded or failed to meet the actor’s moral
obligation. The internal discourse can occur either in the actor’s or another’s mind, as
long as this discourse is thorough and the evaluator has enough information about the act
to arrive at a reasonable judgment. One could counter that the general population may
still be biased against the actor due to the actor’s lack of authority in comparison to the
society’s traditional moral discourses. This objection is valid. However, I suggest that if
an individual from that society is genuinely encouraged to think deeply about the act and
about the moral principles which may or not apply to the act, the individual is likely to
come to a more nuanced judgment. The very notion of evaluating a moral principle is
itself a subversion of that principle’s authority. Authoritative discourse is a problematic
means of determining an act’s place on the morality spectrum because authoritative
discourse tends to depict morality and immorality as opposing binaries; authoritative
discourse prefers binary depictions of morality because such depictions require less
critical thought. A spectrum requires more nuance and therefore more critical thought in
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the individual. Our own definition of immorality is by no means perfect, but it will serve
as a solid base from which to view contemporary research on immorality.
One idea which will deepen our understanding of immorality is “Teflon
immorality,” discussed by Saul Smilansky in the article “Why Moral Paradoxes Matter?
‘Teflon Immorality’ and the Perversity of Life.” Smilanksy argues that there is a
continued and pernicious presence of Teflon immorality in the modern world. Teflon
immorality “is immorality that goes on unchecked—the wrongdoing is not stopped and
its perpetrators, beyond the reach of punishment or other sanction, often persist in their
immoral ways” (229). Teflon is a substance often used on cooking pans because nothing
sticks to it. In the case of Teflon immorality, an act may be perceived by people as
immoral, but the immoral act does not result in a view of the actor as immoral. The actor,
as if he is coated in Teflon, can continue to commit immoral acts without being accused
of immorality himself. For example, a political figure may commit an immoral act, such
as voter suppression, evidence of the suppression is produced, and the suppression is
condemned. Yet, the reputation of the actor, the politician who suppressed votes, is not
tarnished. The politician may himself decry voter suppression as immoral; the residue of
immoral action, or hypocritical action, is not left on the actor. How is the residue so
easily washed away? One possibility is that the politician may actually thrive on bad
press (231). The criticism allows him to criticize the critics, placing him in a morally
favorable position; he becomes a victim, an underdog, a hero. Voter suppression remains
an immoral act, but suppression’s association with the politician is lost amid the more
positive narratives. And, ironically, these positive narratives—hero, victim, etc.—are the
result of the initial negative association with suppression.
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Another possible means of generating the Teflon effect is “saturation” (232).
Saturation refers to the idea that someone can have so many immoral acts attributed to
him that further immoral acts cannot possibly decrease his moral standing. For example,
individuals may become tired of hearing about the politician’s new immoral acts. These
acts no longer elicit an analytical response; internal discourse is stifled by sheer surfeit of
transgressions. Additional moral transgressions may even garner disbelief; an
information-saturated society loses the ability to determine whether or not that
information is valid. Individuals may even resent the media for pointlessly raising further
issues about the politician; attribution of immorality is subtly shifted from the politician
to the media. When saturation occurs, the number of immoral acts committed by the
politician may impress some individuals positively; it takes skill and intellect to be that
immoral and to get away with it. Each new immoral act from that point onward
conversely increases the politician’s moral standing. Even those people who recognize
the politician’s immorality may begin to see him as a beloved anti-hero. Smilansky notes
that Teflon immorality is not a specifically modern phenomenon; it has existed
throughout human history (229). However, I would contend that certain aspects of
modern society are particularly conducive to Teflon immorality. Saturation is more likely
to occur in a society with access to many forms of media and large amounts of
information.
By the time Greene and Waugh were in their 20s, the radio and cinema had joined
newspapers as major media platforms. Reliable information was interspersed with
misleading commercials and tabloid gossip. As the 20th century progressed, television
and the internet would join the information onslaught. Excess of information, both in
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general and specifically applied to immoral actions, may inhibit internal discourse.
Individuals may feel that they have no time to think deeply about the information they
absorb because they might not be able to keep up with the new information that is
constantly being generated. Ironically, the will to stay informed makes people less
informed about their own moral views on the information to which they are exposed.
Thus, a politician’s prior immoral acts are usurped by his newest immoral act, or the
politician’s transgressions are entirely usurped by an unrelated but more interesting news
story. The latest news story may prove to be trivial, but by then the prior story has been
forgotten. There is not enough time to evaluate or even remember each transgression, and
individuals are left with little more than a vague sense that the politician is not quite
morally irreproachable.
However, I contend that we can resist the effects of saturation and that we have a
moral obligation to resist. As I have suggested earlier in the introduction, the practice of
internal discourse requires a conscious choice on the part of the individual. It is not an
easy choice, because internal discourse can involve considerable mental effort. Yet,
individuals must practice internal discourse in order to have a morally sustainable
society, in order to counter the proliferation of Teflon immorality. Our earlier definition
of the morality spectrum includes internal discourse as an essential component.
Authoritative discourse alone cannot effectively counter Teflon immorality; a binary
view of morality is meaningless when designating an act as immoral no longer implicates
the actor as culpable. Furthermore, we would struggle to apply the language of traditional
beliefs, religious dogma, and secular law to the opaque amalgam of data to which we are
daily exposed. A saturated society that relies only on the latest external information for
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its opinions is more susceptible to manipulation. A well-timed news story, whether or not
it is truthful, can disrupt the social narrative, pulling attention away from those whose
interests are at stake. And thus the immoral act slips away from the actor, much to the
actor’s benefit, and much to society’s detriment. A person who practices internal
discourse reasons that an act must have an actor, and that some culpability lies with the
actor for the act he has committed. Internal discourse solidifies the association of the
actor with the act, ensuring that the act sticks. Theories like Teflon immorality help
establish the necessity of internal discourse as an evaluative process.
When examining the morality spectrum, some potential paradoxes may arise. In
“Morally Admirable Immorality,” Troy Jollimore argues that some behavior can be both
immoral and morally admirable (159). One would think that these conditions are
mutually exclusive. Jollimore specifies the term morally admirable; while immoral
actions can be admirable for non-moral reasons, it is a more difficult prospect to argue
that an action is immoral and morally admirable. Moral admiration refers to the
admiration of an actor’s sound moral judgment—and, I would add, admiration for the
actor’s use of internal discourse to arrive at her moral judgment. Jollimore employs the
example of a woman, Jenna, who breaks a sworn promise, but does so based on sound
moral reasoning (162-63). After considering the situation and her potential options, Jenna
determines that the likely result of keeping the secret is more problematic than the likely
result of divulging the secret. Her reasoning is morally admirable, even if her act is
immoral. Had Jenna “decided to play it safe by doing what the moral code
recommended—indeed, required—it would have been quite impossible to criticize her on
moral grounds, despite the fact that by doing so she was, in her own judgment, giving up
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an opportunity to bring about a significant amount of moral good” (163). Certain
objections can be made to this concept of morally admirable immorality. I question
whether the Jenna was actually committing an immoral act by breaking the promise. She
employed internal discourse to carefully decide on the most morally sound action.
Breaking a promise is not ideal; we would prefer not to break promises. Yet, the broken
promise must be weighed within the overall circumstance, including the likely results of
her possible actions in the circumstance. The notion that Jenna has committed an immoral
act because she has transgressed a moral code—the code which asserts that we should not
break promises—evokes authoritative discourse. While she certainly transgressed a
traditional moral principle, she did not act immorally.
I should note that even after using internal discourse to determine the most sound
action we can still choose a less-sound action; we can still choose to act immorally. There
are many reasons why we might choose what we know to be the morally weaker option.
One of these reasons is hypocrisy. Choosing an easier but less moral action over a
morally sound action, often while persuading ourselves that it is the most moral option, is
hypocritic. In “On Hypocrisy,” Eva Kittay argues that hypocrisy is a form of “selfreferential deception” (278). That is, a hypocrite is both the deceiver and the deceived. To
deceive ourselves is a deliberate action. Therefore hypocrisy, like internal discourse,
requires some individual agency. Actively choosing to be a hypocrite, on some level the
hypocrite knows that he is a hypocrite. Thus I would argue that the degree of selfdeception entailed by hypocrisy is not absolute. Hypocrisy is an intentional means of
shirking our moral obligations, of denying the better judgment of our internal discourses,
and therefore hypocrisy is immoral. That is, in most cases hypocrisy resides on the
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immoral side of the spectrum. When analyzing instances of failed adherence to moral
obligation, we must examine hypocrisy as a potential factor.
Consider the following example of hypocrisy: John is an art critic who claims to
dislike modern art. He dislikes modern art so much that the only kind of art he reviews is
modern art. Of course, all of John’s reviews are negative. Yet, it is curious that John no
longer reviews other types of art. Even in conversation, John only talks about modern art,
describing different works in detail and pointing out the aspects of the works he does not
like. John’s friends and readers notice that John has become fixated on modern art. When
his friends try to talk about other kinds of art, John is not interested and immediately
diverts the conversation to modern art. While John has convinced himself that he dislikes
modern art, he is a hypocrite. Part of John’s internal discourse knows that he is fascinated
by modern art and that he appreciates the power of the genre. Rather than remain a
hypocrite, John decides to engage in internal discourse. Eventually, John recognizes that,
as a critic, he has a moral obligation to be honest to his readers about his opinions on
modern art. He overcomes his hypocrisy, and he tells his readers that his views on
modern art have changed. Given this example, we should add to Kittay’s initial definition
of hypocrisy as self-referential deception that the state of self-deception is not necessarily
permanent or irreversible. For some of us hypocrisy is difficult to maintain due to the
conflict between the desire to act according to our moral obligations and the desire to act
otherwise and convince ourselves that acting otherwise is morally sound.
The above study of immorality, the morality spectrum, and hypocrisy has
expanded our understanding of morality as it pertains to this paper: we have a moral
obligation to (1) use internal discourse to evaluate given situations and (2) to act
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according to the most morally sound option upon which we have determined. As we have
observed, many situations are quite complex and can involve moral paradoxes. Therefore,
the use of moral frameworks can be helpful, as long as those frameworks do not devolve
into authoritative discourse. Before moving into a discussion of our key moral
frameworks—the human family, gamification, love in the present, and the perfection
fallacy—I would like to elaborate on Bakhtin’s concept of internal discourse. An internal
discourse, like any discourse, is dialogic. That is, internal discourse entails a struggle
between our own and another’s word. Dialogism is most frequently pictured as the
experience of trying to convey meaning to another through conversation, where the actual
meaning of our speech exists somewhere between our intention and the listener’s
interpretation. Thus the meaning of the dialogue is never entirely our own; it is partly our
own and partly that of the other. This notion applies to our internal dialogues as well.
Internal discourse cannot take place without first taking in external information and
external dialogues. The words of others always pervade our internal dialogues. Bakhtin
adds that, within our speech and thoughts, “a significant number of words can be
identified that are implicitly or explicitly admitted as someone else’s” (The Dialogic
Imagination 354). A portion of the language that composes our internal and external
dialogues existed prior to our birth. We did not invent every word that we use. Each day
we take in the language of others and part of that language is incorporated into our own
lexicon. Embedded in the language of others are the ideas of others. However, these
externally appropriated languages and ideologies are not devoid of our own imprint.
When we learn new things, when we gather words and information, that information
partly belongs to us; we become part of the discursive arena. We evaluate and organize
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the information in our minds, developing opinions and ideas which are partly, but never
entirely, our own. The process by which this inner consciousness-shaping occurs is
internal discourse. Therefore, we might add to our initial two moral obligations,
enumerated at the beginning of this paragraph, that we have a moral obligation to gather
sufficient external data, to possess enough material for internal discourse to work with.
When evaluating the moral standing of a particular circumstance, we must have enough
information about the circumstance to make an adequate judgment. Thus we have a moral
obligation to stay informed and educate ourselves about moral issues. At the same time,
we should not submit to saturation—taking in a surfeit of information without subjecting
it to evaluation.
Part of the process of internal discourse includes the development of moral
frameworks. Moral frameworks are not to be thought of as strict codes, but as guides to
help us contextualize and assess a situation. These guides contain values that we have
previously considered and accepted. For example, utilitarianism is a moral framework
which poses that we should act in a way that will produce the highest amount of good.
Utilitarianism is problematic as a strict code due to a variety of objections—for example,
producing a large amount of good may involve producing a nearly as large amount of
bad. Dropping a hydrogen bomb to win a war may result in a net increase of good, but
dropping the bomb may nonetheless constitute an immoral act. Thus utilitarianism is not
a code to which we should strictly adhere. However, utilitarianism, when applied as a
loose moral framework, can add clarity to our assessments; speculating on the overall
good and bad results of an action is not an unreasonable metric to include in our internal
discourse. Moral frameworks are especially helpful when the actor has limited time to
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decide upon an action. Evaluating a complex situation can require considerable mental
effort. When time is at a premium, we must direct our effort as efficiently as possible.
Overreliance on moral frameworks may not be ideal, but it is often necessary. In some
situations, it is immoral to spend a long time deciding what action to take. A soldier on a
battlefield must decide whether to give first-aid to his comrade or to seek out the sniper
who may shoot more comrades if the soldier takes the time to administer first-aid. It is a
difficult choice. However, if the soldier spends more than a few seconds deciding, neither
option will be available. His wounded comrade will die and more comrades will die from
the sniper. Thus the soldier will have committed an immoral act by not acting. Even
when we have only a few seconds, it is possible to engage in some internal discourse by
applying a moral framework that we have developed through prior thought, through prior
internal discourse that occurred during less pressing occasions. The human family is one
such framework. While the human family can take time to develop in our internal
discourse, once developed, in can be applied to evaluate pressing decisions.
The human family is a moral framework which posits that it is good to view other
people as if they are members of our own nuclear family. That is, we have a moral
obligation to view people not as faceless masses but as individuals, and as people who are
fundamentally connected to us, like family. When we picture people whom we have
never met, in places far away from our own locale, we imagine them with faces, with
faces for which we feel empathy and familiarity. Having made a human connection with
these distant relatives, our internal discourse is better able to evaluate situations in which
people we have never met are being affected. We are more likely to interpret that we
have a moral obligation to act in a way which is beneficial or at least not harmful to other
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humans, to our human family. The human family is a framework which is especially
necessary in the modern world. Economic globalization means that the decisions we
make on a daily basis impact other people around the globe. For example, we may choose
to purchase fair-trade, sustainably grown coffee over coffee from a company that exploits
its workers and the environment. The former coffee is slightly more expensive, but if we
can reasonably afford this expense then purchasing the fair-trade coffee is the most
morally sound choice. However, if we do not think of the coffee growers as conscious,
individual people, we will likely purchase the cheaper, exploitative coffee. Being aware
that humans far away are daily taken advantage of by wealthy corporations is not enough.
There are eight billion people on the planet, and to some of us those eight billion consist
of a single opaque mass. We may reason that the coffee growers comprise only a small
section of the mass, and that it is questionable whether or not we have any moral
obligation to the faceless mass. Our nuclear families are not a faceless mass; the people in
our families, including close friends, seem more real, more like individuals with thoughts
and feelings, individuals whom we care about. In order to act in the most morally sound
fashion, we must see the coffee growers, we must see all people, as actual living
individuals with hopes and dreams not unlike our own. We must give the coffee growers
faces. In our internal dialogues, we can picture the coffee growers, their names, their
appearance, their history, etc. The coffee growers begin to seem more like members of
our family, and we desire to purchase the coffee brand which benefits them or at least
does not harm them.
This simple purchasing of a bag of coffee may seem inconsequential, but I
contend that making morally sound decisions is always consequential. Our actions make
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a difference, though we may not always perceive it. The scope of the modern world has a
tendency to make all of our actions seem inconsequential. Urban landscapes encompass
us and skyscrapers look down upon us like indifferent gods. Even in rural areas we see
jets passing by at seemingly unattainable heights, and inside our homes we are greeted by
the internet’s daunting, protean vastness. Ensconced in the industrial, globalized world,
we feel small. Thus our actions begin to seem futile. Morally sound actions often take
more effort than morally suspect actions; if we feel that our efforts are futile, why not
choose the easier option? If our morally sound actions seem inconsequential, our morally
suspect actions seem equally inconsequential. Indeed, it is questionable whether an action
can be morally sound if its result produces no consequence either way. Such an actions
seems, at best, morally neutral. We do not feel it is possible to affect a giant mass, no
matter how many bags of fair-trade coffee we buy. The human family challenges this
sense of futility. The coffee growers are not a statistic, a demographic, a number, a vague
portion of a vague mass. They are people with faces, people with a consciousnesses,
people with their own internal discourses and moral decisions to make. They are people
we should care about. Our actions affect them, and their actions affect us. We are
interconnected; we share one planet.
In order to better understand the human family’s philosophical position, it will be
helpful to contrast this framework with other related moral frameworks. One such
framework is “ethical altruism.” Ethical altruism is the belief that we should act in a way
which benefits others, rather than in a way which benefits ourselves. In “Too Much (And
Not Enough) of a Good Thing: How Agent Neutral Principles Fail in Prisoner’s
Dilemmas,” Michael Almeida defines ethical altruism as a framework which “requires
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each agent to rank the outcomes of her alternative actions, best to worst, by appeal to the
interests of others, or to the maximization of the utility of others. In its purest form, it
demands that we give no weight to our own interests, but only to the interests of others”
(309). While the idea of choosing actions that will most benefit others sounds morally
admirable, I question whether it is always appropriate to favor others over our own selfinterest. We are not morally obliged to completely sacrifice ourselves to others because
our own lives have value too. Each of us is part of the human family. Therefore, when
evaluating our potential actions in a given situation, it is morally permissible to include
our own potential loss or benefit from those actions. In our coffee example, I specified
that we should purchase the coffee if we can reasonably afford the expense—i.e., if we
will not significantly harm ourselves by spending an extra two dollars on fair-trade
coffee. If we are barely making ends meet and are only purchasing the coffee to survive
another night shift, it is morally justifiable to purchase the cheaper coffee. We should not
expect or encourage a member of our family to bankrupt herself for our benefit.
However, we could reasonably expect a more financially stable member to make a small
contribution to a struggling relative’s livelihood.
Ideally, a given action will result in both the benefit of the actor and the benefit of
other people. Often, however, the situation is not ideal. Consider an example in which a
doctor must deliver medicine to a hospital. If the medicine is not delivered, hundreds of
people may die. In order to deliver the medicine, the doctor will have to cross through
dangerous territory. She could be captured by militant forces or caught in the crossfire.
The doctor is aware of the danger which she would face if she decides to deliver the
medicine. In evaluating the situation, the doctor includes her personal risk along with the
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possible benefit to others. She is not an ethical altruist. For the ethical altruist, the
doctor’s choice is obvious; she must risk her life for others. But the doctor values her
own life and, ideally, would like to preserve that life. The situation is not ideal, yet there
is still a chance that the doctor will survive the action unscathed. After using internal
discourse, the doctor decides that she will deliver the medicine. The potential benefit to
others outweighs her personal risk. Though she has never met the people she might save,
she knows that they are part of the human family, and that she has a moral obligation to
help them. In this case, and in others, it is permissible to bring some harm to ourselves in
order to bring considerable benefit to other people. However, if we are abiding by the
human family, we should always include our own potential benefit or detriment in our
moral evaluations.
As we are contrasting the human family with other moral frameworks, it is
sensible to contrast the human family with another of this essay’s key terms:
gamification. Gamification is a moral framework in which we view the world and the
people in the world as components of an amoral game. A game is amoral because the
goal of the game is to win as many points as possible, generally at the opponent’s
expense. The opponent’s feelings or humanity are not factored into the game and are not
considered by players of the game. Gamification reduces humans to pawns, to be
expended at will, for the maximum benefit of the player or the State for which the player
plays. To explain, gamification does not necessarily require the agent to choose the action
which most benefits herself. Rather, gamification requires the agent to choose the action
which will gain the most socio-political clout—the most points— for her or for her State.
An agent may actually harm her chances of survival in the name of advancing her State.
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Imagine a spy who puts herself in danger in order to kill an opposing spy. Killing the spy
does not benefit her directly, but the act does benefit her team. Any moral qualms about
killing the spy are irrelevant; all that matters is the game.
Gamification is a product of modern society. The globe-spanning political games
of the twentieth century feature wars, espionage, propaganda, and much posturing. The
twentieth century saw the rise of fascist states as well as super-states like the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. A risk taken by a politician, a roll of the dice, could decide the fates of
millions of people. If the politician’s goal is to advance herself and her State, it is
easier—or even necessary—to view the people in other countries as inhuman pawns
controlled by the other side. A decision which kills many of these people can be
dismissed as unfortunate but necessary “collateral damage”; if the decision advances the
power of our State, then the decision is justified. When a politician uses the phrase “the
greater good,” it often signifies “for the greater good of our State,” for the good of those
in power who claim to represent the State. Thus the U.S. can incite a war in a South
American country in order to install a dictator who, however many atrocities he commits,
gains the U.S. standing in the global game. The human cost is irrelevant because the
people in the crossfire do not seem human; they seem like plastic pieces on a map. Their
suffering is justified by the advancement of our place in the standings.
As I discussed in the introduction, the complexity of modern life also has a
tendency to stifle internal discourse, making it easier to dehumanize people. We are
constantly subjected to information, often without the time to think critically about that
information. In the consciousness of citizens, political ideologies become simplified. In
the U.S., political commentators talk about blue states and red states. Whole populations
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are reduced to a color and a simple phrase; we lose our individuality and become pieces
in a game. We are either a blue piece or a red piece. Statisticians are hired to precisely
calculate the number of red pawns and the number of blue pawns. Strategists are hired to
maximize the number of blue pawns and minimize the number of red pawns, or vice
versa. While one may object that this process is simply how democracy functions,
democracy cannot function if citizens are swayed by misinformation or are unable to
acquire adequate information to evaluate the political situation. Nor can democracy
function if the people in power view their constituents as game pieces. Internal discourse
is more effective at determining the most morally sound action if the individual has
gathered sufficient external data and discourses. Under gamification, illegal or immoral
means may be used to win more pawns to our side. Such means could include voter
suppression, intimidation, misleading propaganda, collusion, etc. The morality of these
tactics is not a factor, only the possible outcomes in terms of political points.
In order to deepen our understanding of gamification, it will be helpful to examine
a related moral framework: ethical egoism. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, “ethical egoism” is a moral framework which contends that we should
choose whatever action most benefits our own self-interest, regardless of the effects our
action may have on others (“Ethical Egoism”). An action can still benefit others as long
as that action benefits ourself first and foremost. For example, a homeowner could plant a
tree in her yard that other people can see and appreciate as they walk by on the sidewalk.
Such an act complies with ethical egoism because the homeowner did not plant the tree
for the passers-by. She planted the tree for her own aesthetic enjoyment. An ethical
egoist, however, is also justified in committing an action that benefits no one but herself.
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Such an action might include taking a long nap. The actor’s self-interest at this moment is
rest, and the action satisfies that interest. Assuming the actor is not neglecting some other
obligation by taking the nap, the nap does not harm others. Nor does the nap help anyone
other than the actor. Finally, an ethical egoist is justified in committing an action that
hurts many people, as long as the action benefits herself. Such an action might include a
CEO giving herself a raise while reducing the salaries of her employees. The CEO can
spend her greater salary on a variety of pleasures, while her employees must take out
loans just to pay for their basic needs. She should not feel bad or guilty about the fates of
her employees because, as an ethical egoist, she has chosen the most appropriate
available action. “Ethical egoism” is, in a sense, an oxymoronic term; to be an egoist is to
defy most ethical principles. However, the term highlights the idea that the egoist views
herself as acting in an ethical manner. Thus, the greedy CEO feels no remorse.
Ethical egoism conflicts with gamification because an ethical egoist could not
rank the benefit of his State above his own personal benefit. Nor could an ethical egoist
rank the gaining of political points above his own health, pleasure, security, etc. Someone
who has succumbed to gamification is more concerned about points than about his own
well-being. Whether the political points are for himself or for his State (or for both), the
actor may suffer in the name of political gain. Sometimes the gaining of political points
and the improvement of our well-being are achieved with the same act, but not always.
For example, an aging politician may be so focused on winning the next move that he
becomes stressed and his blood pressure rises. He does not get enough sleep and his
health declines. He no longer enjoys his work. Nonetheless, if he gains political standing
for himself and/or his party then he is acting in a justifiable manner. Even the politician’s
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death from a heart attack can be used to gain political standing. The State may brand him
as a martyr, or the State may make him a scapegoat for a scandal or poor policy decision.
Under gamification, the politician is both a pawn and a player. Under ethical egoism, the
politician’s gradual self-destruction would not be permissible, especially if the politician
is not even gaining any pleasure from the self-destructive acts.
As the above example demonstrates, gamification is not necessarily conducive to
the individual’s health or pleasure. Nor is gamification conducive to other important
human provisions, such as love. “Love in the present” is the next key term I will define.
Love in the present is a moral framework which poses that we have a moral obligation to
love ourselves and others in the present. That is, we should love ourselves and others for
what we are now, not solely for what we once were or for what we might become. I will
begin with an assessment of love in the present’s obligation to self-love: Fixating on
memories of our past, we are more likely to lose our self-love in the present. We need
self-love in the present in order to have a more balanced view of our lives and to
effectively evaluate future actions using internal discourse. If a person fixates on her
prospects for the future—a future in which she can finally love herself, a future in which
she believes herself to be worthy of love—she will not be able to love who she is in the
present. She will consider her present self to be an inferior prototype, a thing that only
exists in order to eventually produce the superior future model. Under love in the present,
we can still reminisce about good memories from the past; our consciousness includes
and is developed from memories of past experiences and the internal discourses which
these experiences generated. Likewise, we can still prepare for the future and work
towards self-improvement. Internal discourse is a progressive, consciousness-building
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process, and one who loves oneself in the present will desire to continue practicing
internal discourse. If we do not love our own minds, the prospect of self-improvement
appears bleak. Thus love for our past and our future is still possible and indeed desirable
under love in the present. However, when these past and future selves overshadow the
our present selves, our present selves begin to seem unworthy of love. Love in the present
seeks to address this possibility; it seeks to foster self-love in the present, so that our
minds are more capable of making morally sound decisions. Our memories of the past
will seem richer if they are not tainted by a belief that our present self is no longer worthy
of love, is no longer worthy of the self-love we once had during those past experiences.
Our hopes and plans for the future will seem more attainable if we love the person who
seeks to attain them.
Some scholars have argued that self-love actually enhances our self-knowledge.
In “Self-Knowledge and Self-Love,” Jan Bransen argues that we cannot gain knowledge
of ourselves—that, in other words, we cannot develop as a conscious beings—without
practicing love for ourselves (309). While Bransen does not specify that this self-love is
centered on the present, her argument implies that it is: She claims that “self-knowledge
is the product of an existential and affective relation between a loving self and the self
she loves to be” (309), suggesting that self-knowledge is dialogic. Bransen’s use of the
term “relation” suggests that self-knowledge is portrayed as the product of an interplay
between oneself and one’s love of oneself. I argue that this relationship is dialogic
because we must also account for the counteracting tension of other forces such as selfloathing or self-hatred. Self-love is not a given, and therefore self-knowledge is not a
given. Nor is self-love to be considered an absolute. The possibility of self-loathing is
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never fully extinguished, and thus self-love is an ongoing practice. Bransen contends that
intellectual growth is stifled by self-hatred because if a person hates herself, she is
“unable to inspect the limits of her agential space” (320). That is, she is unable to
accurately determine her degree of agency in a given situation; she does not know what
she is capable of. Because of her self-hatred, her internal discourse may tell her that she is
not good enough to perform a particular action, or that even if she performs the action,
the result of that action will not be as good as it would for other people because of her
bad luck. Therefore, any attempt she makes to discern the most morally sound action will
fail. In order to make a more accurate assessment of her agential space, she must have
self-love.
I should specify that, when our self-love is centered on the present, our self-love
is ongoing. The present is not static. Unlike a memory of the past, the present does not
exist as a particular slice of time. The present cannot be measured or quantified—thus it
is absurd to ask “how long will the present last?” The present endures, and therefore love
in the present love implies love that endures. Love in the present is not an achievement to
be attained once, it is not a goal to be reached before moving on to another goal, it is an
ongoing practice.
While I have focused the above section on self-love, love in the present also
applies to love for others. That is, we have a moral obligation to love others not solely for
what they once were or for what they might become, but for who they are in the present
as well. A memory of who a friend once was, or a vision of who she might become,
should not usurp our love for her in the present. Likewise, love in the present applies to
our society. That is, we ought to love our societies not only for what they once were or
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for what they might become, but for what they are in the present as well. When we only
reflect on nostalgia for what society was in the past, or on our idealized notions of what
society was in the past, the present will seem inferior, devolved, a corrupt version of its
former self. Such a perspective renders us more susceptible to outlandish goals for the
future—we can make our country great again. In a society focused on the past and the
future, groups of people are vilified, they are depicted as unwanted or parasitic, as people
who are holding society back. In order for society to be cleansed and the future utopia
made possible, these groups must be exterminated. Such logic engenders immoral acts—
racial profiling, terrorism, genocide, etc. These are acts of hatred. When we love our
society in the present, we are less likely to blame society’s faults on a scapegoated group.
We can recognize that the society of the past, however ideal it may or may not have been,
cannot act as a metric by which to justify hatred of the present. We recognize that
oppression is not an effective means of improving our society; oppression is based on
hatred, not love. Those who practice love for the present society are better able to
evaluate future decisions. Through internal discourse, we can determine the most
sustainable and morally sound option for improving our society. Practicing love for the
present, we will not despair over the inevitable pitfalls that we face when attempting any
social or personal improvement. We do not feel that a minor setback has denied our
utopia.
Utopia is an illusion. But for people who lose their love of the present, creating a
utopia seems not only viable but the only reasonable option. The utopian ideal is
reinforced by a moral framework called the perfection fallacy—the false belief that
perfection is not only desirable but attainable as well. Under this fallacy, we have a moral
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obligation to choose whatever action is most likely to bring us closer to perfection,
regardless of how that action might affect others. The perfection fallacy also applies on
the social level; a State has a moral obligation to act in a way which brings the State
closer to perfection. Striving to improve ourselves and striving to achieve perfection are
two different ideologies. We can work toward self-improvement while realistically
accepting that we will never become perfect. Setting ourselves an unattainable goal
destines us to disappointment and self-loathing.
The very idea of perfection is problematic. For example, if we define perfection
as a state in which something has no flaws, we have only created a tautology: a flaw is a
factor which renders something imperfect. Something that is imperfect has flaws, and
therefore something that is perfect has no flaws; perfection creates a circular dynamic in
which its only justification is its opposite (imperfection), while its opposite’s only
justification is perfection. Both the idea of perfection and the idea of a flaw are
subjective. Even the most highly educated philosophers will disagree on what conditions
constitute a perfect society. Likewise, they will disagree on what conditions constitute
individual perfection. Thus, striving for perfection will inevitably lead to conflict, as our
subjective views on perfection do not align with others. Within own minds, our idea of
perfection can change: a scholar might tell herself that as soon as she becomes fluent in
French she will be perfect. However, once she becomes fluent, she finds other perceived
flaws in herself. The scholar should be proud of her achievement in learning French, but
instead she is only dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction may lead to self-loathing; she feels
that she is unworthy of love. In order to counter perfection fallacy, we must practice love
in the present.
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The perfection fallacy, while present to some degree in many societies, became
inflated in the twentieth century in part because of the rise of States. Wimmer and
Feinstein note that States arose not only due to industrialization and technological
advancements, but also due to mass literacy, which facilitated the creation of national
narratives: “The emerging reading public…imagined itself as a national community of
common origin and future political destiny” (768). A State creates a narrative which
portrays the State as the means by which society can achieve perfection. Perfection is, in
some sense, a better selling-point than mere promises of improvement, and States employ
this selling point with the following logic: Prior governments attempted to make
improvements, but they failed. These governments set their sights too low, and they were
not even capable of reaching the minor stop-gap measures they had set as goals. They
were weak and incompetent, and they offered no real or permanent (or final) solutions.
We cannot heal an infection with just a band-aid. We must find the source of the
infection and destroy it before healing can even begin, before society can become great
again. A weak government cannot treat the wound which has impeded social utopia. Only
a totalitarian government with total control can achieve total perfection. In the twentieth
century, various States—such as Nazi Germany, Francoist Spain, and Stalinist Russia—
used this logic to maintain and increase their power. After setting up the initial narrative,
a cause of infection is then identified. If the supposed cause is within the State—a
religious group, a dissenting political party, a racial minority—then oppression and
genocide are the proposed solution. If the supposed cause is coming from another State,
war is the only reasonable option. These means are unlikely to result in long-term social
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improvement, let alone perfection. As efforts to perfect ourselves ironically result in selfharm, so efforts to perfect our society ironically result in social detriment.
I have defined the perfection fallacy as the moral obligation to choose whatever
action is most likely to achieve personal or social perfection, perfection being an illusory,
subjective, and unattainable concept. Other scholars have also examined the idea of
perfection. In “Three Arguments for Perfectionism,” Dale Dorsey describes social
perfectionism as a form of hard paternalism. That is, the State assumes that its citizens do
not know what is good for them—which actions will lead to the State’s idea of a perfect
society. Therefore the State must impose its authority, creating and enforcing laws
designed to generate social perfection. Dorsey notes that “Perfectionism makes a strong
assumption about the state’s knowledge of the good” (134). For the State, what
constitutes “the good” is whatever leads to a more perfect society. Yet, as Dorsey
suggests, for perfectionism to be a viable construct we must assume that the State knows
how to best achieve perfection and that the State’s idea of perfection is, well, perfect—
i.e., the State’s idea of perfection is objective, universally applicable, and irrefutable.
Such an assumption is not justified. As we have discussed above, the concept of
perfection itself is suspect. Yet, there are arguments in favor of perfectionism. Dorsey
highlights the human essence argument (64-67). This argument poses that perfection can
be brought about by unlocking people’s essences; it poses that humans have a core
essence which is essentially good, and that it is possible for any person to live by their
essence. There are methods of enabling this essence. The State claims to know these
methods and how to best encourage them in its citizens. Because we all have a human
essence, we can all attain perfection. Therefore, accede to the State’s authority and every
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citizen will benefit. The logic of the human essence argument is dubious. It is
questionable whether humans are essentially good, and it is questionable whether all
humans have an essence which can be harnessed to bring about this essential goodness,
this perfection. I would add that the human essence argument has been employed in a
somewhat different way by certain States. A State might argue that only a particular
group possesses this essence—for example, descendants of Aryans, Romans, the Norse,
etc. Only a select group is capable of perfection, and therefore this group is the most
naturally fit to rule. Indeed, inferior groups have a moral obligation to obey the master
race. In turn, the master race has a moral obligation to rule. This logic facilitates the
belief in faulty ideologies such as phrenology, eugenics, slavery, and colonialism—as in
our earlier critique of Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden.” A burden is an obligation. A
State which frames its power as a moral obligation further justifies its possession of that
power. Dorsey’s study of perfectionism and the human essence argument helps reveal
that the perfection fallacy has various manifestations, with various accompanying
ideologies.
The key terms elucidated in this chapter—moral obligation, morality, internal
discourse, the human family, gamification, love in the present, and the perfection
fallacy—will continue to arise in the following chapters as we explore how they apply to
and enhance our understanding of Greene’s The Human Factor and Waugh’s Brideshead
Revisited. Inevitably, our analysis will reveal further complications and subtleties within
these moral frameworks. From the groundwork of theory provided in this chapter, we can
build our architecture of literary criticism.
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Chapter 2—
“You have to look for motives”: The Human Family and Gamification
in Greene’s The Human Factor
In this chapter, I will examine how the human family and gamification apply to
and enhance our understanding of Graham Greene’s The Human Factor. The primary
question which these frameworks will help to address is that of Maurice Castle’s
motivation for committing a particular action. In the novel’s climactic scenes, Castle
chooses to deliver classified information to the KGB, knowing that this act has the
potential to harm himself and his nuclear family. He also knows that this act may help
prevent suffering to black South Africans, most of whom Castle has never met. They are
people who are far away from Castle’s home in England, far away from his nuclear
family. I argue that Castle’s primary motivation is the human family, and that Castle uses
internal discourse to arrive at his decision to abide by the human family.
Difficult decisions often involve the weighing of a multitude of conflicting
motives and possible outcomes. Castle is tempted to submit to gamification, as many of
his colleagues have done. The pressure to play the game comes not only from his
colleagues but from the global political atmosphere as well. Yet, despite the
counterpressure, Castle chooses the human family. He recognizes and acts upon his moral
obligation to help the people in South Africa. To situate this thesis, I will begin with a
literature review, analyzing some of the existing criticism related to The Human Factor. I
will then examine relevant textual evidence, demonstrating how this evidence reveals the
presence of the human family and gamification in the novel. I will explain how these two
moral frameworks interact in Castle’s internal discourse, ultimately concluding that the
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underlying motivation for Castle’s actions is the human family.
The most recently published article that focuses on The Human Factor is Robert
Snyder’s 2008 study, “‘He Who Forms a Tie Is Lost’: Loyalty, Betrayal, and Deception
in The Human Factor.” Snyder, like myself, seeks to identify Castle’s primary motives
regarding Castle’s climactic decision. Snyder identifies several elements which drive
Castle’s conduct. The first element is a “misguided” and overly fastidious sense of
conscience (26). Noting one of Greene’s earlier working titles for the novel, “The Human
Fault,” Snyder claims that Castle is pulled by his conscience to act in ways which go
against his better judgment. This division of conscience and judgment is curious. The
suggestion is that Castle has judged that he should not deliver the information to the
KGB, yet his conscience, his empathy for the black South Africans, leads him astray.
Snyder implies that conscience is not logical; conscience only throws off our internal
reasoning, our judgment. Castle’s conscience, then, is his fault. I would counter that
conscience is a part of any judgment. Conscience is a moral component within our
internal discourse. I define conscience as both the awareness of morality and the
awareness of our moral obligation to make morally sound decisions. Thus conscience is
an aspect of our cognitive processes, of our internal discourses. If conscience is an aspect
of internal discourse, then conscience is not without an element of logic. Conscience is
not an unreasoning instinct. Castle’s judgment is not distorted by his conscience. Rather,
his judgment is enhanced by his conscience. Through internal discourse, Castle comes to
the reasonable determination that he has a moral responsibility to help, or at least try to
help, the black South Africans who are being oppressed. His conscience is not a fault.
Though Castle’s actions result in separating him from his family and forcing him to live
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out the remainder of his life in Moscow, he has possibly prevented a nuclear genocide.
Castle’s moral scruples are perceived as a fault because Castle lives in a world in which
gamification has usurped more sustainable moral frameworks such as the human family.
Snyder speculates that the purpose of Greene’s change from “Fault” to “Factor” is
to remove “any implication of authorial censure” (26). The change from Fault to Factor
does indeed shift the tone of the title from accusatory to ambiguous. Still, it is likely that
the term Fault was never intended to imply authorial censure—it is an ironic term, meant
to highlight the idea that modern society views qualities like empathy and altruism as
flaws or weaknesses, sentimentalities that can only hinder our success in the gamified
world of business and politics. However, such faults, given a different, perhaps more
enlightened society, might be viewed as virtues. The fact that Greene ultimately chose the
equivocal Factor highlights the idea that binary moral distinctions often bely the
complexity of moral evaluations. Morality is a spectrum; it is a factor which must be
considered. The immediate designation of some action or quality as a fault is dismissive.
The binary labelling hinders further external discussion and internal discourse. To
characterize Castle’s sense of conscience as a fault—however faulty it may seem to his
MI6 superiors—discounts the possible benefits of the actions which his conscience has
prompted.
Like Snyder, Laura Tracy examines the role of Castle’s conscience as an
influence on his actions. In “Passport to Greeneland,” Tracy seeks to establish a
distinction between two drives—“individual conscience” and “individual necessity” (46).
She claims that Castle’s motivation is not entirely one of conscience; it is also one of
individual necessity. Individual necessity is unconscious (49). While I argue that the
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underlying catalyst for Castle’s actions is the human family, I do not deny the presence of
other, possibly less admirable or less agential influences. Nonetheless, the claim that
Castle acts partially out of necessity must be interrogated. Any claim of unconscious
compulsion entails a mitigation of Castle’s agency. The weight of Castle’s decision to
abide by the human family and deliver the information to the KGB is negated if Castle
has no choice or limited choice in the matter. Tracy supports her assertion by citing The
Human Factor’s scenes which flash back to Castle’s childhood. Like many among the
tenuous, modern British middle class, Castle has had a rather lonely childhood,
immersing himself in daydreams, imaginary friends, and solitary adventures. At the age
of ten, he pities a seven-year-old girl who seems similarly lonely and shy (The Human
Factor 146-47). For Tracy, this childhood sense of pity for the oppressed compels Castle
to feel empathy for the black South Africans: “Naturally, then, he would be drawn to the
extreme anguish endured by the blacks in South Africa” (51). The term “naturally”
suggests that Castle’s feelings are an unconscious drive, a necessity over which he has no
control. Castle’s pity for the young girl does indicate that, even as a youth, Castle has a
heightened sense of empathy for people who are suffering. However, having a heightened
sense of empathy does not imply that Castle is compelled to investigate that empathy
using internal discourse or that he is compelled to act in a way which complies with his
perceived moral obligation. These choices require agency on the part of the actor.
Tracy limits Castle’s psychological agency by half, contending that Castle is
“equally a pawn of his own unconscious needs, which he has mistaken for the promptings
of his conscience” (51). According to this logic, conscience is entirely conscious, but the
unconscious is capable of masquerading as conscience. Castle, then, is deluded. He
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believes that he is making a reasoned, conscious decision when in reality he is only
acquiescing to an unconscious drive. While we are all subtly influenced by the
promptings of our unconscious, to slice Castle’s agency in half and give one half to the
unconscious seems an excessive portion for the unconscious. It is an especially excessive
portion for one who uses internal discourse to consciously evaluate the moral content of
situations. Even after allocating half of Castle’s psychological agency to the unconscious,
we would still have to account for outside limitations on Castle’s agency as well, such as
pressure from his superiors to conform to gamification. Unconscious necessity is a
difficult component to measure. Nonetheless, I would argue that, while humans are
susceptible to some unconscious influence, the consistent practice of internal discourse
can counter that influence, resulting in greater agency for the individual.
Like Tracy and Snyder, Henry Shapiro examines issues of agency and motivation
in The Human Factor. However, Shapiro focuses on ambivalence as his key theme. In
“Morality and Ambivalence in The Human Factor,” Shapiro argues that The Human
Factor is about “moral/emotional/religious clutters or confusions, the confounding of
victory and void” (100). While this quotation seems to be describing ambiguity more than
ambivalence, the ambiguity of these clutters is what causes ambivalence to arise for the
reader or critic; we are unable to decide whether Castle’s character is morally admirable
or morally objectionable. One of the ideas which Shapiro employs to illustrate this claim
is Castle’s name. He describes Castle as a reference to Franz Kafka’s The Castle: “Franz
Kafka’s great Castle sets the tone for much of The Human Factor, in particular for the
many scenes in which an impenetrably hazy Moscow dominates the world of Maurice
Castle” (101). The haziness of Moscow is increased for Castle by the fact that he does not
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speak Russian. His ability to take in external discourses is limited, and therefore his
internal discourse has less information with which to work. While Castle seeks a reliable
moral compass, finding his way is difficult in both the figurative haze of the Cold War
and the literally hazy snowscape of Moscow. I must agree with Shapiro that there are
notes of the Kafkaesque in The Human Factor; the labyrinthine bureaucracy of MI6,
within which Castle works, might also be compared to another Kafka work, The Trial.
However, connecting Maurice Castle to Kafka’s Castle is not the only possible
interpretation of this surname. Robert Snyder describes the surname Castle as an ironic
play on the notion of a home as a man’s castle (Snyder 29). Castle, the king in this
metaphor, attempts to keep his subjects—his nuclear family—safe behind the walls of his
domicile. There is some validity to this view as well. However, I would add a third
interpretation—that the name is an allusion to the colloquial term for the rook in chess.
Therefore the surname Castle reflects the theme of gamification in The Human Factor.
Castle is enmeshed in a world which seeks to mold him into a piece on a board. A
castle/rook is a piece that cannot move obliquely; it can only move in straight lines.
Castle’s stealing of the plans for Uncle Remus is neither subtle nor indirect, but it is
effective. Thus the agency of the rook reflects Castle’s own agency. Furthermore, to
“castle” is a defensive move in chess; it is a desperate move, but sometimes it is
necessary. Castle’s own move is likewise desperate, but it is necessary in order to defend
the black South Africans from genocide. A castle/rook is a relatively valuable piece, a
testament to the power which Castle has to make a potentially world-altering or gamealtering decision. Yet, when the game gets rough, the piece can still be expended as a
means to an end, as a means to winning the game. If necessary, Castle, like his colleague
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Davis, could be poisoned to death, or extinguished in some equally unceremonious way.
Castle’s name reflects the way his superiors like Dr. Percival view him—as a valuable
yet ultimately expendable piece in a game.
In order to explain how Castle’s underlying motivation is the human family, it
will be helpful to elucidate the outside forces which attempt to dissuade Castle from the
human family—the forces of gamification. While I defined gamification in chapter one, I
have not yet thoroughly detailed how gamification applies to The Human Factor.
Gamification is most clearly exemplified in The Human Factor’s portrayal of espionage.
It is not the intent of the spy to engage in honest communication with members of the
opposing State; nor is it the spy’s role to foster better relations and de-escalate tensions.
Spies gather information for their State, and they disrupt or distort the information
flowing to the opposing State. In the system of espionage, humans are reduced to carriers
of information, storage facilities where potentially compromising or potentially beneficial
data resides. Humans are potentialities of political points to be gained or lost. If a spy
assassinates someone in order to eradicate the possibly dangerous information which the
person knows, the spy’s action is justified. Assassination is not murder, it is a redaction.
A successful redaction is a point in the spy’s favor and a point for the spy’s State.
Empathy and morality do not earn any points in spy games, except in the sense of a spy
exploiting these feelings in others. Therefore empathy and morality are burdens to the
spy. Indeed, any ideology, like Catholicism or Communism, is a distraction from the
game. Gamification demands ideological loyalty in its adherents. Dr. Percival, a seasoned
spy for MI6, remarks to a colleague, “Beware of people who believe. They aren’t reliable
players” (The Human Factor 163). The best players believe in nothing but the game of

64
espionage. For Percival, the only moral obligation is to win as many points as possible. A
chess player who takes into consideration his opponent’s humanity is crippled; the best
chess player is a computer. An effective player, like an effective State, is one who values
risk-calculation and point-efficiency. The UK is willing to collude with the white South
Africans on Uncle Remus because the genocide of black South Africans is
inconsequential compared to the possibility of winning political points against the
Soviets—regardless of the human cost, the UK needs South Africa for its gold, diamonds,
and, most importantly, its uranium (55). Percival chooses to kill Davis without sufficient
evidence that Davis is a double-agent (83). While this decision may seem like a
miscalculation given that Davis proves not to be the mole, Percival’s sense of riskcalculation is precise: Davis is a pawn. He is easily replaceable. Even if Davis is not the
mole, his death will not cost Percival any points. Indeed, if the leaks continue after
Davis’s death, then Davis’s death has helpfully narrowed down the list of possible
double-agents. Why not kill Davis? For Percival, moral concerns are irrelevant.
Percival’s obligation is to the game.
When it becomes clear that Davis was indeed innocent of perfidy, Daintry accuses
Percival of killing the wrong man. Percival is dismissive of this accusation, replying that
he only made “an error in the prescription” (214). Murder is a moral construct which has
no place in the game. When a player kills an opponent’s pawn in chess, we do not accuse
him of murdering the pawn. Instead, we evaluate whether or not the move has improved
the player’s position on the board. If the move has improved the player’s position, it is a
good, justified move. If the move has weakened the player’s position, then the player has
made a mistake, a miscalculation. A player in chess does not feel moral revulsion when
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he makes a mistake. He notes his mistake and reevaluates his position on the board,
determining not to make a similar error in the future. The mistake, however regrettable,
cannot be dwelled upon. Any remorse the player may feel will distract him from his
future calculations. Gamification disconnects us from others by removing empathy;
gamification then disconnects us from ourselves by severing all senses that do not serve
the game.
Percival attempts to indoctrinate Daintry by using the analogy of boxes. This
analogy appears throughout The Human Factor. Boxes are symbolic of gamification. We
are meant to stay in our small segment of reality and not think about how our actions
might affect others outside of that segment. The potentially far-reaching consequences of
our actions are irrelevant. We have no obligation, moral or otherwise, to whatever occurs
outside of our box. Boxes mitigate culpability and promote gamification. What happens
in a chess match has no affect on the matches taking place nearby or in the matches
taking place in other parts of the world. Percival tells Daintry, “You haven’t been a long
time with us, have you, or you’d know how we all live in boxes” (38). Daintry, a new
recruit, has not yet been fully initiated into the gamified culture of espionage. When
Daintry seems not to understand the analogy, Percival directs him to a modernist painting
by Ben Nicholson made up of various squares of different shape and color: “Percival
pointed at a yellow square. ‘There’s your Section 6. That’s your square from now on.
You don’t need to worry about the blue and the red…You’ve no responsibility for what
happens in the blue or red squares. In fact not even in the yellow. You just report. No bad
conscience. No guilt’” (38). Daintry is working in a small section of a large organization,
MI6. Yet, there is no doubt that Daintry’s decisions could have far-reaching
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consequences. It is not unreasonable, then, that Daintry has concerns. Nonetheless,
Percival tells him that it is not Daintry’s role to feel concerns. Even within Daintry’s own
box, Percival instructs him to feel no conscience or guilt for what happens. Daintry is not
to engage in any internal discourse. In a sense, Percival is grooming Daintry into being a
pawn. Daintry’s job is to follow orders and to think as little as possible about matters
beyond his ken—“You just report.” A pawn is most useful when the player can count on
it to obey. And Percival is not wrong; it will be easier for Daintry to do his job if he does
not allow himself to ponder the morality of his actions, to practice internal discourse. But
when people sever their conscience, they dehumanize their realities. Life becomes a
game. Thus the box image is apt because a box is both protective and limiting. We can
protect ourselves through willful ignorance and willful suppression of internal discourse,
but such suppression limits our realities. A myopic vision cannot see that gamification
threatens humanity and the planet as a whole. Nuclear war is justifiable when viewed as a
means of gaining political points. Under the ideology of gamification, the thousands dead
from radiation poisoning can be written off as a slight “error in the prescription.”
Like Daintry, Castle too has the culture of gamification impressed upon him. As a
double-agent, Castle’s KGB contact Boris assures him “‘…you know how it is in your
own outfit. It’s the same in ours. We live in boxes and it’s they who choose the box.’
How often he [Castle] had heard that comparison in his own office. Each side shares the
same clichés” (117). The culture of espionage does not differ significantly based on the
country or organization. One cannot play the game effectively if one does not know the
game’s conventions. A chess match in Russia is indistinguishable from a chess match in
the UK. Castle has had to conform to the conventions of espionage, and he has
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conformed relatively well. Appearing to be well-contained and contented within his box,
none of Castle’s superiors initially suspect that he is the source of the leak. Yet, Castle’s
heightened sense of morality, his sense of connection and moral obligation to others,
prevents him from fully acquiescing to gamification. He can only be a “half believer”
(107), because to fully, uncritically believe in any ideology is to reject internal discourse
and therefore moral analysis. When our reality is contained within a small box, when we
do not think about whatever occurs outside of our immediate perception, we cannot take
in discourses outside of that box and thus our internal discourse is stifled by a lack of
external discourses with which to evaluate. Castle recognizes that the box is delusive.
The ideological barriers we create—the iron curtain, apartheid, Jim Crow—are delusional
and unsustainable. Humans are connected.
I would like to raise an idea from Terry Eagleton that will shed light on Castle’s
use of internal discourse. In “Reluctant Heroes: The Novels of Graham Greene,”
Eagleton highlights a peculiar version of heroism which he refers to as the reluctant hero
(97). In order to articulate the concept of the reluctant hero, Eagleton distinguishes
between skeptical detachment and liberal humanism (98). For Eagleton, a “liberal
humanist” is one who believes that humans are essentially good. The liberal humanist’s
faith in the underlying good of humanity is a weakness; it blinds them to the darker side
of humanity. However well-intentioned, liberal humanists are more susceptible to
fixation on whatever cause most attracts their enthusiasm. This fixation results in a
neglect of other, possibly superior discourses. They become blinded to alternative
possibilities.
Those individuals who are more skeptical about the goodness of human nature,
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and who choose to act for the good of humanity in spite of their skepticism, are better
able to have a positive impact on society than their liberal humanist counterparts. The
skeptic, then, becomes a “reluctant hero.” Eagleton contends that many of Greene’s
protagonists display the characteristics of the reluctant hero (98). Eagleton’s
understanding of heroism is especially applicable to The Human Factor because Castle at
times displays skepticism about the essential goodness of humanity. Castle refers to
people like Muller as having “made a hell in heaven’s despite” (The Human Factor 9899). Actually, Castle is quoting a William Blake poem, “The Clod and the Pebble”
(Blake). In the poem, Blake’s first speaker, the “little Clod of Clay,” poses love as the
antidote for the hell-on-Earth which humans have created. However, the Clay’s
counterpart, the Pebble, responds that love leads only to selfishness and joy at the pain of
others—creating Hell out of the possible heaven which Earth provides. While the Earth
has the potential to be heaven-like, humans are just as likely to create a hell-like planet as
a heaven-like one. Thus, humans are not essentially good. Castle’s reference to the Blake
poem indicates his skepticism about the inherent good of humanity. Castle is particularly
skeptical as to the goodness of the ideologies which humanity has created: Referring to
Christianity, communism, capitalism, and religio-political ideologies in general, Castle
reflects, “Perhaps I was born to be a half believer” (The Human Factor 107). Castle is a
“half believer” because part of him wants to believe in an ideology, to believe
unequivocally and uncritically, but he is skeptical that any of the available ideologies are
conducive to moral goodness. I would argue that skepticism is an aspect of internal
discourse. When we approach an issue with skepticism, we subject the issue to a more
extensive internal deliberation. Given the complexities of the modern world, it is
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reasonable to approach any external discourse—political speeches, advertisements,
religious proselytization, etc.—with some degree of dubiety. With skepticism we are less
susceptible to the influence of harmful ideologies such as gamification. We are also less
likely to commit to an action without evaluating the action’s potential consequences.
With the best of intentions, the liberal humanist rushes into the fray, unaware of the
possibly negative consequences of her actions. Through internal discourse, the skeptic
can develop an action which is more likely to produce a positive result. Thus skepticism,
rather than hindering right action, actually facilitates right action.
I am hesitant to apply the term “hero,” reluctant or otherwise, to Castle. I do not
want to suggest that Castle is anything other than a human being, with his own flaws and
anxieties. Nor do I want to suggest that only the heroic can use the human family as a
moral framework. Not every person will have the agency or courage to commit as
explicitly subversive an act as Castle. However, anyone who is capable of internal
discourse can recognize the human family. Though Castle is not a hero, he is a skeptic.
The intellectual process of skepticism, because it is an aspect of internal discourse, is
compatible with the human family. Indeed, skepticism has a causal relationship to the
recognition of the human family as a moral obligation. In order to recognize the human
family, we must practice skepticism for the State’s ideologies and resist the pressure to
conform to gamification. Castle knows that playing the game is the best way to survive,
but he is not willing to relinquish his skeptic’s lens.
The pressure to conform to gamification does not solely arise from the culture of
espionage. Castle is also pressured by British citizens who have been made into pawns by
their State. Pawns do not typically realize they are pawns, as their internal discourse is
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stifled. An effective pawn is willing to harm herself out of loyalty to her State. As I
discussed in chapter one, under gamification, an individual is justified in harming herself
in order to weaken an opponent. Maurice Castle’s mother, Mrs. Castle, provides a curious
example of self-harming gamification in The Human Factor. Upon learning that her son
has defected to the USSR, Mrs. Castle immediately disowns him, referring to Maurice as
“a traitor to his country” (263). Maurice is Mrs. Castle’s only child. Yet, Mrs. Castle
cannot countenance a blow to her State. Sarah offers to explain Maurice’s reasoning, but
Mrs. Castle will not listen; a loss of points is a loss of points, no matter the excuses. One
may counter that Mrs. Castle’s harsh reaction is due to a jolt of emotion from the shock
of Maurice’s defection. But Mrs. Castle has made her calculation: “Mrs. Castle opened
her eyes. Sarah had expected to see them wet with tears, but they were dry, dry and
merciless” (262). Mrs. Castle’s eyes are dry because a pawn does not feel pity for another
pawn. Mrs. Castle does not care about Maurice’s motives; she does not care about the
people he was trying to save. Her State has lost face. Maurice, a disobedient and therefore
undesirable pawn, must be disowned and, if possible, eliminated. Mrs. Castle, an aging
widow, has irrevocably severed herself from her son. She has alienated her daughter-inlaw and her grandson. She has isolated herself from her nuclear family and the human
family. She will die alone, but her State will not be there to hold her hand as she takes her
closing breaths. Mrs. Castle is not an irrational person; she is capable of reason, but she is
not receptive to external discourses aside from those of her State. Her internal discourse
is only made up of the State’s gamified ideology, and therefore her ability to evaluate the
moral character of a particular situation is compromised. She could have listened to Sarah
and at least had the comfort of knowing her son attempted to make a morally sound
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decision. She could have remained close to Sarah and Sam during their confinement in
the UK, taking solace in their shared loss of Maurice. Instead, Mrs. Castle chooses
gamification. She has acted in the interest of her State at the expense of her own interests.
Her reaction will be viewed as an act of patriotic loyalty, and she will be used as a pawn
to promote the UK’s State ideology. The UK will gain political points from Mrs. Castle’s
compliance, but Mrs. Castle will gain nothing for herself—nothing, that is, which could
ever replace her immense loss of family and humanity.
To further expand on my thesis, I would like to contrast my argument with that of
Robert Snyder. Early in this chapter, we examined Snyder’s argument that Castle’s
weakness, his fault, is his conscience. Snyder proposes three more components which
influence Castle’s actions—a hatred of Muller (32), a desire to protect his wife and son
(28), and a sense of debt to Carson (28). I agree that all of these elements are present in
Castle’s internal discourse, yet I argue that Castle’s underlying motive for his action is
the human family. Let us begin with the assertion that Castle is driven by hatred of
Muller. Muller is a deplorably racist character—averring that he has never loved and
could never love even “a single black” (The Human Factor 194)—and Castle does hate
Muller. Recalling an earlier meeting with him, Castle muses that “hate is an automatic
response to fear, for fear humiliates” (96). The characterization of hate as an “automatic
response” indicates that hate cannot be trusted as a reliable means of moral evaluation;
internal discourse requires more than an automatic response, it requires a conscious
effort. Castle makes a choice to practice internal discourse, and therefore his hatred is
tempered. Castle’s internal discourse has determined that hatred is not the most effective
response to his situation; an overriding hatred will not allow Castle to commit the most
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morally sound action. Though Castle is listening to the abhorrent Muller explain his plans
for operation Uncle Remus, a nuclear genocide of black South Africans, Castle’s mind is
not overwhelmed by hatred; he does not picture himself physically harming Muller or
damaging Muller’s reputation. Rather Castle’s mind shifts toward empathy for the black
South Africans, toward the human family. Castle’s motivation is revealed by the path of
his internal discourse, by the scenes he imagines. Castle imagines a nuclear wasteland in
South Africa, littered with bodies. Castle pictures his own black son as one of the
irradiated masses: “He remembered Sam, as he remembered him when he looked at the
newspaper photograph of the drought – the spread-eagled body and the vulture, but the
vulture would be dead too of radiation” (156-57). At this point in the narrative, Sam is
safe in England. He attends an English school and enjoys a comfortable English middleclass childhood. Sam is also an English citizen, having been born in the UK (263); he is
not at risk for being deported to South Africa and therefore there is no chance that Sam
will be directly harmed by Muller’s genocide. Nonetheless, Castle pictures his own son, a
member of his nuclear family, among the victims. Muller is driven by gamification, he
views the black South Africans as faceless, insignificant pawns. His genocide will garner
more political points for himself and for the State he represents. Therefore, Muller
believes his actions are justified. Castle, however, does not imagine pawns, he imagines
humans—not only humans, but family members, people with faces he recognizes and
cares about. People to which he is connected. Thus, Castle’s sense of moral obligation to
the black South Africans is familial. Castle suppresses his hatred for Muller. Instead, he
reacts in a way that is comparable to the way one would react if one’s own nuclear family
were threatened—with the desire to prevent their harm. Castle begins thinking of how to
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help the black South Africans: To physically attack Muller would only play into Muller’s
game. Attacking Muller would prematurely reveal that Castle is the leak in MI6. If that
revelation occurred, Castle could no longer help the people threatened with genocide. He
would be arrested and he could not deliver the information on Uncle Remus to the KGB.
For Snyder, compassion is at most an ancillary influence: “Even the repugnance Maurice
feels upon revelation of the South African government’s ‘Final Solution’ arises less from
horror at the genocidal pogrom than from abiding hatred of Muller” (32). I must disagree.
Hatred is not absent from Castle’s internal discourse, but what Castle imagines reveals
the true motivation for his actions.
In Castle’s imagination, the image of Sam is juxtaposed not only with the bodies
of other black South Africans, but also with the image of a vulture (156-57), which is
curious, as vultures are symbolic and literal harbingers of death. In this case, however,
the vulture itself is also dead; the vulture cannot feed upon the bodies. The vulture,
having succumbed to radiation next to the human corpses, suggests that even those who
prey on the dead and dying will perish too. Muller, in his zeal for racial domination, for
winning the game, would unwittingly destroy himself and his State with nuclear warfare.
Indeed, the entire planet risks destruction—not only through nuclear radiation, but
through the racist ideologies which people like Muller cling to. The ideology of predator
and prey, of player and pawn, belies the interdependence of their fates. The image of the
dead vulture arises in Castle’s mind to exemplify the fact that Muller is, in effect, plotting
to kill himself, along with all white South Africans. The vulture, then, evokes a note of
pity for Muller, an otherwise intelligent man who willingly bends his intelligence to his
own and others’ destruction. Muller, like other tyrants before him, is a pathetic figure.
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That people would turn the world, would turn humanity, into an amoral game, is pathetic.
While Castle has some hatred for Muller, to act purely out of hatred for such a pathetic
man is to beat a dead vulture. Castle looks beyond this redundancy to the lives he still
might save.
The second argument that must be addressed is that Castle is motivated primarily
by an obsessive desire to protect his wife and child. Snyder argues that Castle is stricken
by the “tragically corruptive force” that is his love for Sarah and Sam (Snyder 28). I do
not wholly discount Castle’s desire to protect his family as a motivational influence. It is
true that Castle cares deeply for his wife and child and that he wants to protect them; he
wants them to be “secure” (The Human Factor 19). As I have noted, Castle’s nuclear
family is not in any immediate danger from Muller. Sarah and Sam are safe in England,
and if Castle obeys his superiors at MI6, Castle and his family will presumably remain
safe. Castle is tasked by MI6 with facilitating collusion between apartheid South Africa
and the UK. Castle’s superiors give him this assignment because of his experience in
South Africa and in dealing with Muller (54). It is a disagreeable and morally fraught
assignment, but Castle is capable of completing the task. If Castle is truly obsessed with
protecting his family, he would be willing to forgo the objections of his better judgment,
of the human family.
It would seem more plausible that Castle’s decision is the product of a misguided
desire to protect his family if Castle is unaware of the risks his action poses—if, say, he is
under the mistaken assumption that delivering the information to the KGB will make
Sarah and Sam safer. Snyder asserts Castle’s “blindness” to the consequences of his
actions (28). However, there is evidence that Castle is well aware of the possible risks his

75
actions pose to himself and his nuclear family. After the meeting with Muller at which
Castle learns of the plans for nuclear genocide, Castle returns home to his wife and son.
Putting Sam to bed, he reflects that he “knew that the time had almost come when he
would lose the child for ever” (The Human Factor 172). Though this loss is ostensibly a
reference to Sam’s growing up and the inevitable distance that arises between father and
teenage son, there is a secondary meaning to Castle’s thoughts. Namely, Castle is
cognizant of the action he is to take just after putting Sam to bed—he is going to make a
copy of Muller’s documents to give to the KGB. One could argue that Castle is not yet
aware of what he is going to do, that he makes the copies on an impulse. But consider
that Castle has already made the decision to take the documents home with him rather
than lock them in the safe at his office, as is MI6 policy (201). Much has already been
made in the novel regarding the importance of not taking files out of the office—Davis’s
penchant for reading files at the pub during his lunch break is what initially draws
suspicion from his superiors (80-82). Castle knows that, at this point, he has already
taken a major risk which will in turn draw suspicion upon him. Knowing that Davis was
killed on less-than-damning evidence—Davis was completely innocent—Castle can hold
little doubt that even an innocuous breech of protocol, if detected, will result in his own
extermination. Castle is not an arrogant man, the importance of caution was reinforced in
him while working in South Africa: “Castle had lost both audacity and innocence for ever
in South Africa while he was waiting for the blow to fall” (20). Now, seven years after
leaving South Africa, gazing down at his still-young son, with the stolen documents in his
possession, Castle’s thought that “the time had almost come when he would lose the child
for ever,” takes on the added significance of both his very dangerous preceding actions—
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taking the documents home—and his irrevocable impending actions—copying and
delivering the documents to the KGB. Whether these actions result in his assassination,
his imprisonment, or (as later occurs) his forced exile, in all likelihood Sam will not see
his father again. The suggestion that Castle is unaware of these possibilities, that Castle is
blind to the danger he poses to others, is unwarranted.
Though Castle is aware of the possibilities his actions may incur, one might still
argue that he is driven to take action by a misguided motive. The final motivation which
Snyder posits is that Castle acts out of “an exaggerated conviction of indebtedness to
Carson for facilitating Sarah’s escape from South Africa” (28). Carson is Castle’s former
colleague, who saves Sarah and (the then in utero) Sam by helping them escape South
Africa. Castle continues to remember Carson, framing Carson as a person of strong moral
character (The Human Factor 105-07). Indeed, Castle recalls Carson’s words as one
recalls a wise aphorism: “He [Castle] thought of what his Communist friend Carson had
so often said to him – ‘Our worst enemies here are not the ignorant and the simple,
however cruel, our worst enemies are the intelligent and the corrupt’” (99). Carson
recognizes that, in the political game, the best players are calculating and amoral. An
unintelligent, brutal person often makes an excellent pawn. Nonetheless, we do not blame
a pawn for a particular move in chess. We must look to the player who has set the piece
in motion. Carson, as a devoted Communist agent, is committed to the game. Castle is
more skeptical about political ideologies, but I would argue that Carson’s words help
Castle to recognize the gamified culture in which he is enmeshed. Thus Carson provides
an important external discourse which Castle integrates into his own internal discourse.
Castle’s enduring memory of Carson prompts Snyder’s assertion that Castle’s
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own actions are an attempt to repay Carson. It is also true that Castle’s initial decision to
work with the Soviets was at the request of Carson (186). However, the idea that Castle
has been goaded into Uncle Remus by an inflated feeling of obligation to Carson belies
the fact that Castle cuts ties with the KGB earlier in the novel. Upon cutting ties, Castle
feels “relief because he had repaid as far as he could his debt of gratitude to Carson”
(143). Castle is satisfied that he has done all he can for Carson. Perhaps Castle would
have liked to do a little more, but sending any further information to the KGB would put
his life at risk; Castle is not at all willing to compromise his own and his family’s safety
to pay back the now-deceased Carson. Castle will later renew his ties with the KGB in
order to deliver the Uncle Remus dossier, but he does not do so for Carson. When
listening to Muller explain his plans for Uncle Remus, Castle does not think of Carson,
but of the human family and of what will become of the black South Africans should
Uncle Remus be allowed to commence. Carson was able to save Sarah and Sam. But
Carson was not able to save all of the people being oppressed in South Africa. Indeed,
Castle is willing to put the very people Carson worked so hard to save—Sarah and
Sam—at risk. One could argue that Castle is inspired by Carson’s courage; this claim is
certainly valid. While copying Uncle Remus, Castle reflects, “Carson at this point would
have taken the ultimate risk” (174). Still, there is a difference between being inspired by a
person’s courage and being compelled by a perceived debt to that person. Castle thinks of
Carson only after he takes the documents home and begins copying them. He thinks of
Carson to gain courage. Castle’s belief in the human family has prompted his action, but
one cannot blame Castle for wanting to bolster his courage by thinking of an inspirational
friend. The notion that Castle acts primarily out of a feeling of indebtedness to Carson
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renders Castle a Quixotic figure, obsessed with settling a debt of honor. The human
family is not a debt of honor; it is a moral obligation.
The process of analyzing a character’s motivation for committing a particular
action is complex. One is rarely motivated by a single element. Yet, the attempt to
discern a character’s motives is not futile. By examining textual evidence and employing
a germane critical framework, we can gain insights into a character’s rationale. We can
also gain insights into the outside forces which are influencing a character. I have used
two moral frameworks in this analysis, the human family and gamification, in order to
critique the character of Maurice Castle in The Human Factor. Scaffolding these
frameworks is Bakhtin’s concept of internal discourse. Castle’s internal discourse—the
image of his dead son next to other corpses and next to a dead vulture—during the
moments prior to his taking the documents indicates the primary motivation for his
action, the human family. The gravity of Castle’s choice, and the degree of agency
necessary to make that choice, is revealed by the opposing ideology, gamification. Castle
is enmeshed in an increasingly gamified world of State politics. The culture of espionage
most notably exemplifies the forces of gamification. Spies play games with human lives
for political points. Castle is pressured from his superiors at MI6, such as Percival, and
from other citizens of his State, including his own mother. These forces seek to inhibit
Castle’s internal discourse, and they are not easy to overcome. Through the threat of
repercussions such as loss of career, loss of family, and loss of life, Castle is discouraged
from transgressing the rules of the game. Thus the gravity of Castle’s choice to subvert
those forces is considerable. He relies on his moral agency to prioritize the human family.
Once in Moscow, Castle is used by the Soviets as a pawn to gain political points, and
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soon the news of Castle’s defection and the plans for Uncle Remus are broadcast in
England and worldwide (262). Broadcasting Castle and the Muller documents is the best
way to humiliate the UK, but the press conference will also bring Uncle Remus under
international scrutiny. Therefore it is quite likely that Castle’s actions have prevented a
genocide. But the culture of gamification persists. Castle has challenged this ideology,
but his actions alone cannot break down the game. Like a painting by Ben Nicholson, the
boxes remain on the walls of our consciousness. The physical and ideological walls
created in the twentieth century, the opposing sides, are not easily dismantled. Castle
cannot fully leave the game; he defects from the UK only to find himself in Moscow, on
the other side of the board. Yet, Castle demonstrates that some subversion of the game is
possible. The Human Factor concludes on a note of tempered hope. Castle is finally able
to speak with Sarah over the phone, and Sarah asks him to “please go on hoping” (265).
The phone connection is cut off, and we do not know if Castle hears these words, but the
possibility is there. If more people begin to recognize the human family, we can pose a
greater challenge to the hegemonic ideology of gamification. Thus, as individuals we
have a moral obligation to educate ourselves, to practice internal discourse, and to
recognize our connection to people around the world. Someday, we may ensure that
threats like nuclear genocide are no longer a real possibility.
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Chapter 3—
“To see a friend”: Love in the Present and the Perfection Fallacy
in Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited
A classic work of 20th century literature, Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited
remains an enigmatic novel, with many questions still to be explored. The research
question I will seek to answer is the following: what motivates Charles Ryder’s
conversion? I argue that the primary influence of Ryder’s conversion is his recognition of
love in the present, a moral framework which I outlined in chapter one. In order to
acknowledge love in the present, Ryder must overcome an opposing moral framework—
the perfection fallacy. I will specify from what and to what Ryder converts. For much of
the novel, Ryder identifies as an atheist (Brideshead 85). However, his atheism
intensifies during the later stages of the novel, as Lord Marchmain begins to decline and
prepare for death. Ryder becomes more outspoken and critical of the Flytes, especially
Julia (335). By the time Lord Marchmain is on his deathbed, Ryder is not only an atheist
but an intolerant atheist. During Lord Marchmain’s deathbed scene, Ryder has a
conversion experience. However, I do not argue that Ryder completely converts from
intolerant atheism to Catholicism. Rather, Ryder converts from intolerant atheism to a
form of Catholicism which I will term “agnostic Catholicism.” Though Ryder’s
conversion is a gradual process, occuring throughout the novel, the moment of Lord
Marchmain’s death, and Marchmain’s own preceding conversion, are key points in which
Ryder becomes willing to use internal discourse to examine religion and religious
arguments; Ryder accepts his interest in religious and specifically Catholic discourses, an
interest he has tried to suppress. His ostensible disdain for any religious faith or dogma is
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tempered by his recognition of love in the present. Ryder becomes open to new ideas,
including the possibility that Catholicism has moral validity. He gains openness to
external discourses relating to spiritual and religious matters. However, given that
Ryder’s conversion process is both gradual and nonlinear, the deathbed scene does not
mark his final conversion. Ryder has another important conversion experience in the
epilogue, in which his agnostic Catholicism is revived by love in the present. I will begin
this chapter with a literature review examining relevant scholarship on Brideshead. I will
then give a more thorough definition of intolerant atheism and agnostic Catholicism.
After defining these terms, I will explore how love in the present and the perfection
fallacy are manifested in Brideshead. I will explain how these moral frameworks enhance
our understanding of Ryder’s conversions, concluding that love in the present is the
underlying motive for Ryder’s conversion to agnostic Catholicism.
Among scholars, one of the ongoing conversations about Brideshead concerns the
nature of Ryder’s conversions in the novel. The first article I will examine pertains to this
conversation. In “The Triple Conversions of Brideshead Revisited,” Laura Mooneyham
explains that much of the criticism about Brideshead relates to dissatisfaction with
Ryder’s ostensible conversion (226), specifically with his conversion at Lord
Marchmain’s deathbed. Marchmain himself converts just before his death, which seems
to prompt Ryder’s own conversion. Yet, Mooneyham notes that the idea that Ryder has
converted to Catholicism does not accord with the novel’s prologue and epilogue: “The
presumably converted Charles seems disassociated from his moment of grace” (226).
This criticism is valid, as the Ryder of the prologue and epilogue, now 39, appears to be
in an apathetic and jaded state. He feels “stiff and weary in the evenings and reluctant to
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go out of camp” (Brideshead 5). Ryder is in charge of some military operations in rural
England. He struggles with the incompetence of his soldiers and with his own
indifference. In short, Ryder does not seem particularly spiritually enlightened. Thus
critics—including Edmund Wilson and Kingsley Amis—have claimed that the power of
the earlier conversion is negated by the prologue and epilogue (Mooneyham 225).
Mooneyham attempts to address this issue by posing a different strategy for viewing
Charles’s conversion. She argues that Ryder’s conversion is actually two-fold, an initial
conversion during Lord Marchmain’s death scene and a second conversion in the
epilogue, during which Ryder visits Brideshead chapel. Mooneyham refers to this second
conversion as a reconversion: “Charles the participant in the action is prepared for the
overwhelming emotion of his first conversion, while on another level Charles the narrator
is prepared for the reconversion in Brideshead chapel which concludes the frame story”
(226). According to Mooneyham, Ryder’s initial conversion did not last. Over time,
Ryder descended into the depressed state in which he appears during the prologue and
epilogue (227). Only after visiting Brideshead chapel is Ryder able to reconvert to
Catholicism. Mooneyham asserts that this reconversion will be more lasting than the
initial conversion because the new conversion does not contain the overwhelming,
rending emotion of the initial (226). Rather, Ryder leaves the chapel with a slight smile
on his face, just enough to be noticed by a colleague. The final line of the novel is the
colleague’s comment, ‘“You’re looking unusually cheerful to-day,’ said the second-incommand” (Brideshead 351). Given Ryder’s prior depressed state, even a slight smile
would constitute a noticeable change. Ryder has not been overcome with emotion, but he
does gain solace from a renewed faith. I agree with Mooneyham that Ryder’s conversion
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during Lord Marchmain’s dying scene is not the only conversion event which Ryder
experiences during Brideshead. However, I disagree with the idea that Ryder’s
experience in Brideshead chapel is a reconversion. Rather, I argue that both conversions
are part of a gradual conversive process. Neither conversion is a finite experience with a
clear beginning and ending; it is misleading to characterize Ryder’s conversion as twofold. Thus I also question the notion that Ryder fully and permanently converts to
Catholicism in the epilogue scene. There are other moments in Brideshead which can be
understood as conversion experiences for Ryder, including his artistic “conversion to the
baroque” (82), and Ryder’s process of conversion will continue even after he leaves
Brideshead chapel in the epilogue.
Another scholar who focuses on the issue of Ryder’s conversion is Dustin
Faulstick. In
“A Pilgrimage to Passion: Charles Ryder’s Emotional Conversion in Brideshead
Revisited,” Faulstick, like Mooneyham, describes Ryder’s conversion at Lord
Marchmain’s deathbed as primarily emotional. However, Faulstick focuses on Ryder’s
emotional suppression after Sebastian tells him there is nothing more Ryder can do to
help him: “Charles’s emotional response to people has been discouraged by his failed
relationship with Sebastian” (179).
It is true that at times Ryder displays an uncanny lack of emotion. For example,
immediately after being told by Sebastian that Ryder cannot help him, he goes to say
goodbye to Lady Marchmain (Brideshead 168). When Ryder admits that he was the one
who gave Sebastian the money on which Sebastian got drunk, Lady Marchmain brutally
admonishes Ryder. Yet Ryder’s reaction is emotionless. He recalls, “I was unmoved;
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there was no part of me remotely touched by her distress” (167). Ryder, frustrated at what
he perceives as the Flytes’ treating Sebastian like a naughty child, gives Sebastian money
in the hopes that this freedom would restore some of Sebastian’s self-control. Ryder does
not try to explain his reasoning to Lady Marchmain. He is numbed from the emotional
stress of having failed to help Sebastian. Given Ryder’s evident emotional suppression,
Faulstick’s suggestion that Ryder’s conversion acts as a cathartic, emotional release is
reasonable (Faulstick 176). However, I argue that the emotional release could not have
come about without an ongoing internal discourse regarding religion. In the hours
succeeding Lord Marchmain’s death, Ryder speaks alone with Julia. They both know that
their relationship must end, but where Julia claims that she only realized it that day,
Ryder admits that he has known their relationship must end “all this year” (Brideshead
340). Ryder has been grappling with the discord between Julia’s and his own religious
views for some time. His knowledge that his relationship with Julia is untenable reflects
Ryder’s understanding that his own religious views are untenable, that his intolerant
atheism is a willed suppression of religious interest that cannot be maintained. Prior to
the deathbed scene, images in Ryder’s internal discourse indicate that he is aware of an
impending conversion: “And another image came to me…the last blizzard of winter
raging and the snow piling up against the door. Quite silently a great weight forming
against the timber; the bolt straining in its socket” (310). While Faulstick describes this
image as an example of emotional suppression (Faulstick 174), it indicates a suppression
of intellectual internal discourse. Ryder struggles to accept the part of his internal
discourse which is interested in religion, but this interest presses like snow against the
door of a cabin. Certainly, emotion is a part of the frozen mass, but intellectual
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fascination is the major element. Ryder’s conversion at Lord Marchmain’s deathbed is
characterized by his acceptance of a previously suppressed internal discourse with
religion—specifically a discourse with Catholicism.
Like me, RoseMary Johnson objects to Faulstick’s overemphasis on the emotional
component of Ryder’s conversion (Johnson 163). In “Human Tragedy, Divine Comedy:
The Painfulness of Conversion in Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited,” Johnson
argues that Ryder’s conversion is better understood when viewed as a product of two
narrative modes—the comic-romantic and the tragic-ironic modes (163). I agree that
Brideshead does have both comedic and tragic elements. While Brideshead is not as
overtly satirical as some of Waugh’s early works, such as Decline and Fall, the novel is
not a pure tragedy. The early scenes of Oxford and the undergraduate antics of Ryder,
Sebastian, and Anthony Blanche are particularly humorous. However, Johnson’s
argument that “The tension between comic romance and tragic irony in BR is strongest
when Waugh addresses the theme of conversion” warrants further interrogation (165).
Johnson provides an example of tragic irony in the fact that Ryder’s deathbed conversion
experience immediately results in the end of his relationship with Julia (167); it is ironic
because the apparent source of tension in their relationship, Ryder’s intolerance of
Catholicism, is resolved, and yet this resolution only spurs their relationship’s end.
Though one might view this breakup as an instance of tragic irony, there is also
something morally admirable in the notion of two people realizing that they are not right
for each other and deciding together to end their relationship, rather than allow it to
fruitlessly drag on. The breakup is ironic, but not necessarily tragic. Johnson argues that
the tragic-ironic element of Ryder’s conversion is in tension with the comedic element.
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The comic-romantic element of Ryder’s conversion is most exemplified in the epilogue,
during which Ryder has a moment of renewed faith (Johnson 170); Ryder, in a sense,
gets a happy ending. I agree that there is an interplay between comedic-romantic and
tragic-ironic elements in Brideshead. Yet, I question Johnson’s portrayal of Ryder’s
failed relationships with Sebastian and Julia as means to end, as means to conversion.
Johnson concludes that “the God who reveals himself to Charles in the Epilogue is a
tremendous lover of whom Sebastian and Julia were only forerunners” (170). That is,
conversion—the comedic ending—is a result of tragedy—the loss of Julia and Sebastian.
As I noted above, Ryder’s breakup with Julia need not be viewed as purely tragic, as a
tragic counter-element which facilitates Ryder’s conversion in the epilogue. Julia and
Ryder mutually decide to continue their journeys alone, and they part without any harsh
words or accusations. Furthermore, Julia and Ryder’s breakup does not necessarily
indicate that they no longer love each other. A breakup, just as much as a marriage, can
be an act of love. Ryder’s relationships with Julia and Sebastian are not means to an end,
but important experiences in themselves. These relationships form a critical part of
Ryder’s internal discourse. They are not mere precursors of Ryder’s conversions: they are
integral aspects of Ryder’s ongoing conversive process.
In order to articulate the nature of Ryder’s conversion, I will expand on two of
this essay’s key terms—intolerant atheism and agnostic Catholicism. These terms will
help us understand from what and to what Ryder converts. Let us begin with intolerant
atheism. The term “atheism” can be defined as the view that God or any gods do not
exist. In this definition, there is no provision stating that atheism entails intolerance of
those who hold beliefs other than atheism. One can identify as an atheist, and hold that
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atheism is the most reasonable moral framework, without admonishing people who hold
other views. In other words, one can be a tolerant atheist. Conversely, one can also be an
intolerant atheist: one who maintains that atheism is the only viable moral framework and
that anyone who holds a different view must be admonished and, if possible, converted to
atheism. It is an intolerant atheist’s moral obligation to chastise and proselytize nonatheists. Intolerant atheism can be compared to other extreme religious sects despite
atheism’s anti-religious ethos. Intolerance, and therefore intolerant atheism, is a product
of the perfection fallacy. When we seek to perfect ourselves, we are more likely to be
uncritically drawn to a particular ideology, whether that ideology is atheism, Catholicism,
fascism, etc. That is, in the desperate quest for perfection, an ideology may initially seem
so conducive to achieving perfection that the we fail to practice internal discourse,
choosing rather to fully adopt the ideology. Consequently, we become critical of those
people who have not accepted the ideology, as such people are perceived as holding an
inferior ideology.
The State takes advantage of our intolerance and promotes it through propaganda
and political rhetoric: the State depicts the inferior ideology as the cause of social
imperfection. Often an ideology will be attached to a particular group in order to more
easily identify the cause of social imperfection. In Brideshead, Rex Mottram and his
political colleagues underestimate the Nazi ideology by portraying the Germans as
impotent and syphilitic (Brideshead 294); the Nazis wouldn’t dare start a war with the
British because the British are a superior race with a superior State. Meanwhile, the Nazi
State is depicting the Jewish people as the cause of social imperfection. If someone or
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some group is considered a barrier to our personal or societal perfection, we are more
inclined to practice intolerance.
In Brideshead, Ryder’s intolerant atheism is engendered by the perfection fallacy:
Ryder is not willing to accept the religious aspect of his internal discourse because he
views religion as “nonsense”—as a cognitive shortcoming (86, 164, 335). Ryder is not
always an intolerant atheist; early in the novel, he claims that he has “no religion” (85),
but he does not try to convert the Flytes during his early interactions with them. Ryder is
perplexed, and secretly intrigued, by the Flytes’ Catholicism. Nonetheless, Ryder is
tolerant of the Flytes’ non-atheist views. However, after Lord Marchmain moves back to
Brideshead and his health begins to decline, Ryder becomes more intolerant of the Flytes’
belief in Catholicism. For instance, as Lord Marchmain is dying, Julia decides to summon
the local Catholic priest, Father Mackay, from the nearby rectory (335). Ryder is
incensed by Julia’s decision; Ryder knows that Lord Marchmain is an atheist like
himself, and he cannot countenance the thought of a Catholic priest being present during
Lord Marchmain’s death. It is Julia who should be converting to atheism, not trying to
convert Lord Marchmain back to Catholicism. In attempt to hinder Julia’s efforts, Ryder
turns to Lord Marchmain’s doctor: “We must stop this nonsense” (335). Ryder’s use of
the word “must” indicates the degree of his perceived obligation to prevent the spread of
any ideology other than atheism. The immediate and intense response from Ryder
suggests that he has not evaluated the situation using internal discourse. People who are
not intolerant atheists are likely to view Ryder’s intensity as uncalled-for, given the
situation. Considering that Lord Marchmain is clearly on the verge of death, it is unlikely
that the presence of a priest can do him much harm. And the presence of Father Mackay
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may provide much comfort to Julia and Cara. Thus Ryder’s urgent appeal is met by a
nonplussed doctor. The doctor replies, “My business is with the body. It’s not my
business to argue whether people are better alive or dead, or what happens to them after
death. I only try to keep them alive” (335). Though the doctor admits there is a possibility
that the shock of seeing a priest could kill Lord Marchmain, Lord Marchmain’s death is
imminent regardless of whether or not a priest is present. Furthermore, Ryder is not
concerned about Lord Marchmain’s health; Ryder is aware, like everyone else, that Lord
Marchmain is not long for the world. Ryder is concerned about Lord Marchmain’s
dignity. That is, Ryder believes that the Flytes are taking advantage of Lord Marchmain’s
weakened state in order to reconvert him. Ryder has a moral obligation to prevent this
reconversion. It is only by remaining an atheist, and by dying as an atheist, that Lord
Marchmain can retain the dignified moral framework by which he lived.
While Ryder directs his external discourse of intolerant atheism toward the Flytes,
Ryder’s internal discourse has also become intolerant; he has become intolerant of his
own suppressed interest in religious matters. He cannot love himself in the present
because he refuses to accept an important aspect of his internal discourse. Ryder is
fascinated by religion and particularly by Catholicism. During Ryder’s early visits to
Brideshead, he is intrigued by Sebastian’s Catholicism (86-87). He begins by asking
Sebastian how he can believe all the “nonsense” (86). Yet, rather than shifting the
conversation to a more sensible topic, Ryder continues to press Sebastian with questions
about Catholicism. It is finally Sebastian who puts an end to the topic, to which Ryder
replies, “You started the subject. I was just getting interested” (87). Ryder, despite his
incredulous opinion of religion, desires to know more, to gather further external religious
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discourses. Ryder’s use of the term “nonsense” is the same term he uses in the quotation
with the doctor. It is a term which indicates Ryder’s view that Catholicism, and all
religion, is illogical. There is insufficient evidence to justify the belief in religion. An
ideology such as Catholicism, with its rituals and mystic elements, may seem particularly
illogical to Ryder. He perceives illogic as imperfection: an example of this perception is
in Ryder’s argument with Brideshead, Sebastian’s older brother, about the best way of
treating Sebastian’s alcoholism. Ryder is in denial about Sebastian’s alcoholism; he
believes that he can moderate Sebastian’s consumption if given approval by the Flytes,
and thereby that he can rectify Sebastian’s imperfection. When debating Brideshead,
Ryder uses the term nonsense: “D’you know, Bridey, if I ever felt for a moment like
becoming a Catholic, I should only have to talk to you for five minutes to be cured. You
manage to reduce what seem quite sensible propositions to stark nonsense” (164).
Ryder’s view of Catholicism is becoming more intolerant. Though he is still relatively
cordial with Brideshead, there is a tone of exasperation in his riposte; Ryder wants to
save Sebastian, while Brideshead is willing to accept him in his imperfect state. Such a
willingness to remain flawed and allow others to remain so seems illogical, nonsensical,
to Ryder. Ryder’s use “nonsense,” combined with his exasperated and eventually
antagonistic response to issues of religion, reflect an internal struggle. In the deathbed
scene, Ryder appears desperate to suppress Catholicism in Lord Marchmain because he is
desperate to suppress his own internal discourse regarding religion. Ryder cannot love
others, such as Julia and Sebastian, in the present because of their imperfections. In turn,
Ryder cannot love himself because of the imperfections he perceives in his own internal
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discourse. He attempts to stifle any internal discourse concerning his interest in religion,
and thus he becomes an intolerant atheist.
Ryder is an intolerant atheist by the time Lord Marchmain is on his deathbed. I
argue that he converts from intolerant atheism to “agnostic Catholicism,” a term I will
now define. Though “agnostic” is often defined as having neither belief nor disbelief in a
god or gods, in its broader form, an agnostic is one who is not wholly committed to any
ideology. The idea of not being committed to any ideology recalls my account of
skepticism in chapter two. I argued that skepticism is a necessary component of a healthy
internal discourse. A skeptic is no less likely to immediately disregard an ideology as she
is to immediately accept an ideology; exposure to an ideology will result in critical
analysis by the skeptic—the skeptic will practice internal discourse. An agnostic is not
willing to commit to any particular ideology: therefore, an agnostic can be a skeptic. I
note that the agnostic “can be” a skeptic because it is also possible that an agnostic
immediately and uncritically rejects any ideology to which she is exposed. An agnostic
might also have complete indifference toward all ideologies. Such an agnostic would not
qualify as a skeptic. In Brideshead, Ryder converts to the skeptical variety of agnostic
Catholicism in the deathbed scene, but he slowly descends into an indifferent form of
agnostic Catholicism, into the form we see in the prologue and epilogue. In the final
scene of the epilogue Ryder renews his fascination with Catholicism, converting from the
indifferent version of agnostic Catholicism to the skeptical version. What distinguishes
agnostic Catholicism from general agnosticism is the importance of Catholic discourse
within the agnostic Catholic’s cognitive architecture. Even when Ryder becomes
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indifferent to Catholicism, Catholic discourse is not vacant from his psyche; indifference
does not imply absence.
In the prologue and epilogue, Ryder’s agnostic Catholicism is apathetic and
uncritical. Ryder still identifies as a Catholic, and his soldiers recognize him as such.
Hooper, after noticing that Brideshead has a chapel, tells Ryder “I looked in and there
was a kind of service going on—just a padre and one old man, I felt very awkward. More
in your line than mine” (16-17). Ryder, having been to Brideshead many times before, is
well aware of the chapel, but he is uninterested in it. Hooper, seeing the look of
indifference on Ryder’s face, shifts gears, mentioning the large fountain “in a final effort
to excite my interest” (17). Hooper’s effort is a failure. Ryder has lost the moral curiosity,
the skepticism, necessary for a healthy internal discourse. Without moral curiosity, there
is vacancy. Ryder still attempts to do his duty as an officer, managing the tedious
logistics of breaking down and setting up camps, but his heart is not in the tasks. He
knows that, as a superior officer, one of his duties should be to inspire his troops, to keep
their morale up. But this duty is one he is unable to execute; referring to his demoralized
soldiers, he laments, “And I, who by every precept should have put heart into them—how
could I help them, who could so little help myself?” (5). Ryder cannot inspire his troops
because he is unable to inspire himself. Without his skeptic’s curiosity, Ryder’s internal
discourse suffers. It is understandably difficult to display a positive, inspiring external
discourse when our internal discourse is suffering. Such a display is more than Ryder can
manage.
Ryder’s internal discourse has become depressed because he has lost his ability to
love himself in the present. Referring to his experience at a military encampment, Ryder
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avers, “Here my last love died” (5). Ryder’s last love is ostensibly his love for the British
military. He states the above while detailing the incompetence of his superior and inferior
officers. However, the fact that Ryder refers to this love as his “last” indicates that he has
no love remaining at all. Though not actively in combat, Ryder has been confronted with
the travails of a world war. It is difficult to love oneself or others in an atmosphere of
such global upheaval. Even in a rural landscape as yet untouched by bombs, the images
of nature in the prologue are damaged: “ivy still supported part of what had once been the
walls of a fruit garden; half an acre of mutilated old trees behind the wash-houses
survived of an orchard” (3). The image of ivy holding onto ruined walls suggests futility.
The ivy, like Ryder’s ostensible Catholicism, conceals a more tenuous structure. Ryder is
still an agnostic Catholic, but his façade hides a crumbled, apathetic internal discourse.
The trees are described as “mutilated.” One would not typically describe the trees in an
overgrown orchard as mutilated, only left unattended and returning to a more natural
state. Mutilated is a term which suggests personification: the trees evoke an image of
bodies on a battlefield. Ryder is thinking about the devastation of the war. The war taints
what would otherwise be a charming rustic scene. Ryder can find no charm, let alone
love, in his present environs.
Inhibiting Ryder’s love for the present is his concern about the future. At night in
camp he lies awake “fretting” (9). The outcome of WWII is as yet undecided. Yet, the
domestic military responsibilities with which Ryder has been charged have proven banal
and pointless. Moving from camp to camp, Ryder thinks critically of his superiors, who
can give him no clear answer as to whether his soldiers will be sent abroad. Ryder notes
the new colonel of his camp, a petty individual who forces Hooper to get a haircut in the
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dining hall (8). One would hope that, as a colonel, he is focusing on larger concerns, but
“Hooper seemed to obsess the colonel that evening” (8). A fresh haircut is a superficial
expression of a perfectionist ideal. Though Hooper’s hair requires only “a few snips,” its
lack of perfection is abhorrent to the colonel. The colonel is not making Hooper get a
haircut in order to benefit the regiment or to contribute to the winning of the war, he is
doing so to gain power through the propagation of the perfection fallacy. That people in
power, people like the colonel, should be practicing such a moral framework does not
bode well for the future of England. Ryder is distraught by the scene and leaves as soon
as the haircut begins; despite his indifference toward religion, Ryder is not indifferent to
everything. He is worried about the future of the war. These concerns for the future
inhibit Ryder’s internal discourse. It is difficult to have a balanced, evaluative discourse
when one sees mutilated bodies when in a bucolic orchard.
Compounding his anxiety about the future of the war, Ryder is concerned about
the future generations of British society. Emblematic of the next generation is one of
Ryder’s officers, Hooper. Ryder notes that “In the weeks that we were together Hooper
became a symbol to me of Young England” (9). Hooper’s view of the world is direct and
superficial. He has no interest in art or in intellectual discourse. He is uninterested in
moral evaluation. Though Hooper has no religious proclivities, he is not an atheist.
Religion and morality are not substantial enough to warrant examination. While he has an
“overmastering regard for efficiency,” Hooper is incompetent (9); Ryder describes him as
“a man to whom one could not confidently entrust the simplest duty” (9). Hooper
appreciates efficiency because it is calculable and observable. However, he does not
believe that he has a moral obligation to be efficient. Thus he is perfectly content to be
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inept, much to Ryder’s chagrin. Hooper’s moral compass is stifled by his lack of internal
discourse. Hooper cannot empathize with others; he can only judge another’s degree of
efficiency. It troubles Ryder to think that the younger generation is made up of Hoopers.
Ryder’s study of Hooper’s character indicates that Ryder is still capable of empathy. To
examine another person’s character thoroughly, judging that person’s likely thought
processes, requires considerable internal discourse. Ryder invests his mental energy in a
study of Hooper because Ryder is concerned about the future generation of England, of
whom Hooper is an archetypal representative.
To understand why Ryder considers Hooper to be emblematic of the new
generation, we must examine the social conditions which shaped Hooper and his kin.
Hooper is a product of a British ethos which seeks social perfection. Education in poetry
or painting has no place in the modern vision of a perfect society; efficiency is perfection.
The aspects of culture which Ryder values have no interest to Hooper: instead of
education in literature and great historical battles like Thermopylae, Hooper has been
inculcated with “a profusion of detail about humane legislation and recent industrial
change” (9). The modern British education system has created a narrative in which the
State is constantly moving toward social perfection. The State has been heroized. That is,
the State has heroized itself by indoctrinating its citizens. Hooper has not been taught
about the less admirable aspects of British history and society. His education focused on
the UK’s progressive policies, its “humane legislation.” Ironically, it is inhumane to elide
the humanities from education. Without great external discourses to draw upon, such as
the elegiac speech of Marc Antony in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (Shakespeare 3.2.73107)—Hooper’s internal discourse is stifled. The Hooper generation’s internal discourse
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is stifled. Julius Caesar, a play involving collusion and political betrayal, has no place in
the socio-political perfectionism which the modern State seeks to propagate. Ryder avers
that Hooper has been educated in “recent industrial change.” The increasing
industrialization of the modern British economy has benefited the British State; a strong
economy allows the State to exert more power on surrounding economies. The State
wants the new generation to believe in the value of industrialization, to believe that,
through greater industrialization, social perfection can be achieved. The less admirable
effects of industrialization, such as pollution and colonial exploitation, were not featured
in Hooper’s education. Rather, the State has built an education system which seeks to
create a generation of citizens who believe in the State’s power to create social
perfection. When modern history is presented as a series of increasingly beneficial
improvements, citizens are more likely to believe that social perfection is a possibility—
that the pursuit of perfection is not a fallacy. But, as I discussed in chapter one, social
perfection is a fallacy; perfection is not achievable, and rhetoric of a utopian future
engenders hatred of the imperfect present. Hooper has been taught to believe in social
perfection, and for this reason he values efficiency. Yet, Hooper’s incompetence
demonstrates the flaw in a system of education which is based on a fallacy; Hooper
believes the State will reach maximum efficiency, will reach perfection, regardless of his
participation in that process.
Hooper has been instructed in a social narrative presented as linear, progressive,
and ineluctable. Satisfied by this narrative, Hooper and his colleagues do not attempt to
examine other external discourses: Riding in the officers’ carriage of the military train,
Ryder observes that “None of them had a book” (10). Reading books is an unnecessary
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expenditure of energy. Reading is perceived as inefficient because the act does not
provide an immediate, superficial, and calculable benefit. This perception benefits the
State because exposure to narratives which contradict the State narrative, the perfection
narrative, could undermine the State’s message. If citizens do not believe that social
perfection is possible—and that such perfection is only possible through obedience to the
State—citizens will begin to question the legitimacy of the State’s power. Thus, the
State’s education system has discouraged its citizens from reading.
The progenitors of people like Hooper, the people with State power who have
inculcated the perfection fallacy into the new generation, are represented by Rex
Mottram, who is a Canadian politician and a member of Parliament (111). Mottram’s
primary desire is to increase his power within his State, within the UK government. He
seeks to shape himself into what the State views as a perfect politician: As Ryder
observes, Rex seeks “to consolidate his gains; to strike the black ensign, go ashore, hang
the cutlass up over the chimney and think about the crops” (185). In other words, Rex
desires to become the archetypal warrior-politician which the modern State demands.
Thus Mottram wants to have the right connections, he wants to talk tough about rivals—
to “give Europe a good strong line. Europe is waiting for a speech from Rex”—he wants
to say the right things at the right time, and he wants a wife from an aristocratic family.
His moral obligation is to act in a way that gains him the most power and therefore brings
him closer to perfection. I am using the term perfection ironically, as perfection is a
fallacy, but for Mottram perfection is a real possibility, if he checks the right boxes.
Mottram’s prioritization of power limits the external discourses to which he is willing to
expose himself. It makes sense that Mottram has engendered the Hooper generation:
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Mottram does not place any value on formal education. Referring to a university
education, Mottram says, “No, I was never here. It just means you start life three years
behind the other fellow” (111). Formal education is an inefficient means of gaining
power, power being, to Mottram, the only metric by which any act should be judged.
Mottram’s phrase “start life” suggests that life does not even begin for Mottram until he
can start gaining power. If Mottram could have skipped his entire childhood, he would
have done so. He went through childhood because he had to. If Mottram were to justify
the concept of childhood, he would do so by noting that it is a necessary box one must
check on the illusory road to perfection. And Mottram is not the only one who views life
as such a checklist. He does not want to be three years behind the “other fellow” because
there are many fellows who have decided that Shakespeare will not help them. It is better
to educate oneself by reading industrial statistics and stock quotes. Mottram believes he is
in a kind of race with these other fellows. Thus he is always looking to the future, to the
perfect finish line, a point which is always on the horizon but never quite within reach:
“Rex demanded a wider horizon” (185). Mottram has no love for the present. He is
focused entirely on the future, and only on a superficial future in which he is closer to
perfection.
Indeed, it is arguable whether Mottram is capable of love in any form—of the
past, of the future, of another person, etc. Love, like education, is not an effective means
of gaining power. Love for the wrong person or the wrong thing could lose one power.
The perfect politician displays just the right amount of love. I use the term “display”
because the perfect politician does not actually feel any love; he only plays the role of
love, displaying just the right amount to garner the approval of his equally loveless
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colleagues. In his courtship of Julia Flyte, Mottram attempts to display a sufficient
facsimile of love to convince Julia to marry him. In a scene at Brideshead, Mottram
brings Julia a tortoise for her Christmas present. The tortoise’s shell has been garishly
bedazzled with diamonds forming Julia’s initials (164). The living creature is usurped by
the glittering façade. In Mottram’s eyes, the creature has been improved by the diamonds,
brought closer to perfection. The tortoise symbolizes Mottram’s idea of love—a
superficial gesture serving as a means to self-promotion. Mr. Samgrass wryly asks what
will happen when the tortoise dies: “Can you have another tortoise fitted into the shell?”
(165). Of course, one cannot place a new tortoise in a dead tortoise’s shell. The shell is a
part of the tortoise. When the tortoise dies, so does the shell, regardless of how many
diamonds one puts on it. The internal discourses inside our shells are what shape us into
conscious beings. To bedazzle one’s exterior with titles, political appointments, and
social accomplishments may seem appealing. But such efforts toward a more perfect
exterior will not grow one’s vapid interior.
Perhaps the most curious manifestation of Mottram’s perfectionist ideology is in
his conversion to Catholicism. Mottram has no religious internal discourses. Religion,
like love, is a box one must check in order to become an ideal modern politician. For
Mottram, conversion to Catholicism is necessary in order to marry Julia—conversion is a
box to check so that the next box, marriage, can be checked. It is not a Catholic law that
Catholics cannot marry non-Catholics. However, the most politically proper marriage
takes place between two members of the same church. Julia explains to Mottram that “a
mixed marriage is a very unostentatious affair” (191). Mottram wants the most
ostentatious “affair” possible. Thus he makes the decision to convert to Catholicism.

100
Lady Marchmain, Julia’s mother, is disturbed by Mottram’s reasoning for conversion,
perceiving that he has no spiritual attraction to Catholicism (191). Mottram hopes that his
conversion will be a simple matter of signing some contract, like the laws he signs in
Parliament. Lady Marchmain tries to explain that formal conversion to Catholicism
requires considerable preparative study—conversion is an intellectual experience
necessitating the evaluation of many external discourses. Responding to Lady
Marchmain’s concern, Mottram’s dislike of education surfaces: “Look, Lady Marchmain,
I haven’t the time. Instruction will be wasted on me. Just you give me the form and I’ll
sign on the dotted line” (192). Taking the time to learn Catholic teachings would only put
Mottram behind the other fellows. The idea that the instruction would be “wasted” on
Mottram evokes Mottram’s appreciation for efficiency; an efficient action produces no
waste. Knowing that he will not gain anything from religious instruction, that he is
impervious to religious discourses, he seeks to avoid a futile exertion of energy.
Nonetheless, Lady Marchmain insists that Mottram must receive religious instruction in
order to convert. Mottram’s attitude towards his conversion exasperates Father Mowbray,
a priest specializing in conversion. Mowbray complains to Lady Marchmain that
Mottram “doesn’t seem to have the least intellectual curiosity or natural piety” (192). We
cannot have a healthy internal discourse without intellectual curiosity. We must be
curious about the external discourses to which we are exposed, curious enough to
investigate those discourses internally. Yet, Mottram sees no immediate, calculable value
to having intellectual curiosity. Thus he has omitted this practice from his mind. The
other characteristic which the priest claims that Mottram lacks is “natural piety”—the
internal discourse which draws people to examine spiritual and religious matters, and to
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respect these matters. One can be an agnostic and have natural piety. Indeed, one can be
an atheist and have natural piety—that is, one can be an atheist and still have some
interest in and respect for religiosity. Mottram has no sense of piety because piety does
not serve his perfectionist ambitions. Only the appearance of being pious will help him,
and this desire to act the part is what exasperates Father Mowbray.
By the time of the prologue and the epilogue, 1944 (351), Mottram has gained
considerable political power in the UK government (349). He is able to exert his
influence domestically and abroad. Education has been modernized, curriculums have
been made more efficient, and intellectual curiosity has been discouraged. Hooper’s
generation has emerged from the secondary schools; they have emerged with values like
that of Mottram—a belief in social perfectionism and a belief that only obedience to the
State can bring about a perfect society. Mottram now gives polemical speeches on the
radio. Nanny Hawkins asks Ryder, “Did you hear Mr. Mottram last night? Very nasty he
was about Hitler” (349). Mottram, a powerful, narrow-minded man preaching invective
in order to solidify domestic obedience, has ironically become a mirror of Hitler’s own
rise. To be fair, Hitler deserves to have very nasty things said about him. However,
people like Mottram cannot understand the real threat that Hitler poses—Hitler is a threat
to civilization, to culture, to humanity. Hitler is bent on achieving his version of a perfect
society; he laces his rhetoric with the delusion of the Übermensch and the Aryan utopia.
Mottram, with no sense of culture, spirituality, or the real value of human life, can only
dislike Hitler because of the economic disruption Hitler has caused. Hitler and the Nazis
have damaged the UK’s economy and have caused a great deal of inefficiency; Hitler has
stifled Mottram’s own vision of perfection. Hitler is a threat to Mottram’s political
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power, should the Nazis win the war. Yet, Mottram has also benefited from Hitler.
Mottram knows how to play the role of the political hero, the perfect savior. It is the same
role that Hitler plays. If we cannot subvert the narrative of perfectionism, fascists will
continue to rise and fall. The most effective way to challenge this narrative is by
practicing a particular moral framework—love in the present.
Ryder’s initial recognition of love in the present occurs during a conversation
with Cordelia, Sebastian’s youngest sister. Ryder is distraught upon learning of
Sebastian’s living conditions—Sebastian is an alcoholic living in Morocco, renting a
dingy hotel room above a bar (304-05). Yet, Cordelia does not seem particularly
distraught. She confides in Ryder that Julia does not love Sebastian like the two of them
do. Ryder hesitates, struck by Cordelia’s words: “‘Do.’ The word reproached me; there
was no past tense in Cordelia’s verb ‘to love’” (308). Cordelia’s use of the present-tense
form of love causes Ryder to make the unpleasant realization that he does not love
Sebastian. That is, Ryder does not love the person Sebastian is now, in the present.
During their youth at Oxford and their early visits to Brideshead, Ryder’s friendship with
Sebastian was as strong as a brother’s (34). From his friendship with Sebastian, Ryder
learns that “to know and love one other human being is the root of all wisdom” (45).
Ryder’s love for Sebastian contributed to Ryder’s own self-love. Ryder refers to his love
for Sebastian as a form of wisdom because Ryder’s internal discourse grew from his
experiences with Sebastian; Ryder became wiser. Yet, Ryder’s love for Sebastian has
faded. Ryder cannot accept the dissolute person who Sebastian has become. Ryder still
cherishes his memories of Sebastian, he still loves the Sebastian of the past, and it is this
Sebastian whom Ryder likes to recall: “It is thus I like to remember Sebastian, as he was
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that summer, when we wandered alone together through that enchanted palace” (79-80).
There is nothing wrong with Ryder recalling the good times he had with his friend.
However, focusing only on who a friend once was causes the friend’s present self to pale
in comparison. Ryder has idealized his memories of Sebastian; the “palace” they walked
through was not enchanted, nor was it a palace. When compared to the idealized,
amiable, attractive Sebastian of Ryder’s youth, the current, struggling Sebastian seems
undeserving of love. To Ryder, the current Sebastian represents the past Sebastian’s lost
potential—the lost chance at achieving perfection. Thus Cordelia’s words awaken Ryder
to his hypocrisy; Ryder believed that he still loves Sebastian, but Ryder realizes that he
only loves a memory, a version of Sebastian which does not exist in the present.
Reacting to Cordelia’s narrative about Sebastian’s current life, Ryder manifests a
desire to save Sebastian. That is, Ryder wants to act in a way which brings Sebastian a
better future. He exclaims to Cordelia, “Poor Sebastian!...It’s too pitiful. How will it
end?” (308). He asks Cordelia this question because his mind has already shifted to
thinking of Sebastian’s future. Ryder wants to help create a version of Sebastian that is
worthy of love, a future Sebastian who does not and never will exist. The thought of the
current Sebastian is “too pitiful”—too pitiful to think about, too pitiful to warrant deeper
evaluation in Ryder’s internal discourse. His internal discourse is limited, and he is
unable to see the positive elements of Sebastian’s life. Cordelia tells Ryder that, though
Sebastian is an alcoholic, he has been accepted as a custodian of sorts at the local
monastery (307). Sebastian can be in a place which gives his life some meaning and
connects him to his Catholic faith. He will be looked upon fondly by the missionaries,
who “will think of him as a queer old character who was somehow part of the Hope of
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their student days, and remember him in their masses” (309). Sebastian has a community
in Morocco. His situation may be pitiful, but it is not “too pitiful” to render him unworthy
of love.
Ryder’s conversation with Cordelia represents a conflict between love in the
present and the perfection fallacy. Cordelia understands that she has a moral obligation to
love in the present. Her love does not apply solely to Sebastian, it applies to the world.
We see her love for the world in her healthcare work—Cordelia volunteers as a nurse in
the Spanish Civil War and later serves as a nurse in WWII (258, 348). Because Cordelia
is able to love in the present, she is able to work toward a better future. She is aware of
the present world’s imperfections, of the great suffering in the world, but her love for the
present gives her the strength to accept this suffering and to have a healthy outlook on the
future. Cordelia’s discourse about the future is healthy because it is realistic: On leaving
Spain, she tells Ryder, “the authorities were very polite, thanked me for all I’d done, gave
me a medal and sent me packing. It looks as though there’ll be plenty of the same sort of
work over here soon” (301). For all her efforts, Cordelia receives the standard thank-you
package and is sent away. She knows that Spain, now under Franco, will continue to
suffer and that more suffering is likely with the prospect of an impending world war. Yet,
Cordelia does not feel that her work has been futile. She does not entertain the notion of
achieving a utopian society, and therefore her work is not tainted with hatred of the
present’s imperfections.
When Ryder finds out about Cordelia’s volunteer work in Spain, he is troubled by
the thought that she has wasted her youthful potential: “It hurt to think of Cordelia
growing up quite plain; to think of all that burning love spending itself on serum
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injections and delousing powder” (300). Ryder does not want his idealized, youthful
memory of Cordelia to be compromised by Cordelia’s present self. Cordelia has lost the
chance at the perfect image Ryder hoped she would become. Ryder believes that Cordelia
has wasted the “burning love” she had as a youth. But Cordelia’s love is not a finite
resource, it is an ongoing practice. Ryder’s struggle to relinquish the idealized past
distorts his internal discourse, and thus he fails to see the beauty of Cordelia’s actions and
the positive work she has done. This struggle parallels Ryder’s inability to relinquish his
memory of Sebastian as the perfect youth he once loved. In truth, Sebastian was never
perfect, no human ever is. Ryder does not yet have the open, skeptical outlook necessary
to abide by love in the present. At Lord Marchmain’s deathbed, Ryder will convert from
intolerant atheism to agnostic Catholicism. Only then will he be able to use love in the
present as his moral framework.
At Lord Marchmain’s deathbed, Ryder becomes increasingly resistant to any
religious reference, and he is especially intolerant of the presence of any priest. We have
discussed Ryder’s efforts to keep Father Mackay from the deathbed and Ryder’s attempt
to draw the doctor to his side. Yet, a shift occurs after Julia gives Father Mackay
permission to enter the room (337). Father Mackay begins to perform the rites of
absolution, but Lord Marchmain gives no sign of hearing; he appears to have passed into
an unconscious, near-death state. At this point, Lord Marchmain is still an adamant
atheist. In order to be fully absolved, he must give some sign that he has understood and
accepted the priest’s prayers. Ryder, the intolerant atheist, kneels and begins to pray: “O
God, if there is a God, forgive him his sins, if there is such a thing as sin” (338). Ryder is
having a conversion experience; his atheism is being displaced by agnostic Catholicism.
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Ryder is still unsure if there is a God, he is unsure if Catholic concepts like sin exist.
Ryder is skeptical, and he has become open to the possibility that these concepts exist. He
is willing to examine religion with his internal discourse. Ryder prays for some kind of
sign, if only “the bare acknowledgement of a present” (338). Lord Marchmain is drifting
toward a place where the past, present, and future do not exist, where time and space are
one. Ryder’s prayer for Lord Marchmain to return, briefly, to the present, is also a prayer
that Ryder himself return to the present. Ryder has been so caught up in the past and
future that he cannot love himself: he hopes that Julia will remain in his future, though he
knows this hope is vain (340). Ryder is like Julia, who tells him in an earlier scene that “I
feel the past and the future pressing so hard on either side that there’s no room for the
present at all” (279). As with Ryder, Julia has too much regret for the past and anxiety
about the future to have any love for her present self. Now at Lord Marchmain’s
deathbed, Ryder hopes that there is some room left for the present, just enough for Lord
Marchmain’s, and his own, conversion. Ryder is becoming aware not only of his own
present state, but also of the world in its present form: As he prays, he reflects that “all
over the world people were on their knees before innumerable crosses” (338). Ryder is on
his knees with these people; he recognizes that the act of prayer is powerful because
through prayer one connects with people around the world who are praying at the same
time as oneself, in the present. He does not know whether or not God exists; he is
agnostic. But he has become open to religious discourse, and he has accepted his
fascination specifically with Catholic discourse: he is an agnostic Catholic.
Ryder’s conversion to agnostic Catholicism continues as he watches Lord
Marchmain briefly awaken to make the sign of the cross (338). At first, Ryder fears that
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Marchmain’s motion is to wipe away the priest’s blessing, to deny the love he has been
offered in the present. But when Marchmain completes the symbolic gesture, Ryder
recalls, “Then I knew that the sign I had asked for was not a little thing, not a passing nod
of recognition, and a phrase came back to me from my childhood of the veil of the temple
being rent from top to bottom” (338). Ryder has prayed for a sign indicating the
possibility of God’s existence, and he has interpreted Lord Marchmain’s conversion as
that sign. Yet, the sign itself is not over; it is not a fleeting moment to be resigned to the
past, to memory. The sign is not “a passing nod of recognition.” The sign is ongoing. The
sign exists in the present and therefore it is always with him. It is a sign that Ryder can
love himself for who he is now, that he can accept the part of himself that is fascinated by
Catholic discourse. In the introduction, I discussed William James’s assertion that
conversion creates a sense of wholeness (James 186). While James is referring to
conversion to a particular religion, rather than conversion to an agnostic form of that
religion, James recognizes that conversion can be a gradual process. Ryder’s conversion
to agnostic Catholicism is ongoing, it is in the present. Ryder’s recollection of the image
of the temple’s veil being torn apart is an allusion to The Bible (The Bible, Matt., 27.51).
On Jesus’s death, the veil in the Temple of Jerusalem is rent in two. The purpose of the
veil was to separate the holiest part of the temple, where God resides, from the human
portion, where people worshiped (Quarles 272). Thus the rending of the veil represents
the removal of the barrier between God and humanity. The image of the veil indicates
that God’s connection with humanity is now continuous; the veil is not merely lifted, it is
torn in two. The image of a veil suggests self-censorship; to put a veil over one’s eyes is
to limit one’s vision, to limit one’s reality. The veil was put in place by Ryder himself.
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Thus the tearing of the veil arises in Ryder’s mind to signify the creation of a wholeness
within Ryder’s consciousness, the removal of a barrier, the acceptance of previously
suppressed internal discourses. The veil cannot be un-sundered. Like the connection
between God and humanity, Ryder’s conversion is ongoing; he will not become an
intolerant atheist again.
As I discussed in the introduction, a conversion experience can be gradual, but
conversion is not necessarily linear; one’s conversion can have both hills and trenches.
As we move to the epilogue of Brideshead, Ryder has descended into a trench. His love
of the present has been overshadowed by regrets about the past and concerns about the
future. Specifically, Ryder is concerned about the war and about the next generation. He
is concerned by what people like Hooper suggest about the fate of England. The
perfection fallacy has inundated modern England, as it has Germany. One cannot blame
Ryder for his struggles; the world is at war, and God seems to have abandoned the people
for whom he rent the veil. The present seems bleak. Ryder’s internal religious discourse
is not actively suppressed as it was prior to his deathbed conversion. Rather, the flood of
new discourses created by the war have overshadowed and confused his religious
discourse. His mind shifted to the severe discourses of the future, Ryder’s ability to
evaluate the present discourses has been compromised. Ryder’s career is in the arts; he is
an architectural painter (226). Now in charge of a military unit, his position could not be
further from artistic discourse. And the great architectural structures are crumbling
beneath bombs every day. Brideshead, a once great work of English architecture, has not
been bombed. But it has been repurposed into a military administrative building. The
frescoes that a younger Ryder once painted on the walls have been cruelly defaced by

109
bored soldiers (346-47). Hooper cannot understand why anyone would build such a place
as Brideshead; he asks Ryder, “What’s the use of it?” (350). Brideshead is not an
efficient building, and therefore Hooper cannot appreciate it. Aesthetic appreciation is not
an aspect of Hooper’s internal discourse—a fact which, for the artist Ryder, is
particularly distressing. Ryder is not the only one worried about the future and is
struggling to cope with the changes of the present: Still residing in Brideshead, the aging
Nanny Hawkins cannot cope with the harsh new external discourses. Ryder reflects that
“The changes of the last years had come too late in her life to be accepted and
understood” (348). To understand a new external discourse, we must be able to evaluate
the discourse internally, integrating that discourse into our overall cognitive structure.
Hawkins, who must be in her mid-eighties at this point, does not have the mental strength
for such a feat. But Ryder is only 39 years old (5). He is still capable of evaluating the
troubling discourses of his present world. In order to evaluate them, he must renew his
love for the present. He must have a conversion experience.
Ryder saves his visit to Brideshead chapel for last (350). His neglect of the chapel
suggests apathy towards his internal religious discourse. However, the fact that Ryder
visits the chapel at all indicates that he is still an agnostic Catholic and not an atheist.
Though he does not come to Brideshead chapel looking for a conversion experience, he is
seeking some connection to the present. Just before going to the chapel he tells Hooper
“I’m homeless, childless, middle-aged, loveless” (350). Without a sense of love in the
present, Ryder feels not only loveless but homeless as well. The places where he once felt
at home have changed irremediably. Even Ryder’s present age seems alien to him—he
tells Hooper he is “middle-aged” because he longs for the youth he has lost. Certainly,
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Ryder is middle-aged, but we do not go around telling people we are middle-aged unless
our age bothers us, unless we cannot come to terms with our present selves. While Ryder
is still an agnostic Catholic, he has lost the sense of provisional wholeness which he
experienced at Lord Marchmain’s deathbed. As Ryder enters the chapel, he is struck by
its unchanged appearance. Specifically, Ryder notices the “art-nouveau lamp” which
continues to burn as it had during his earlier visits (350). The continuous flame
symbolizes the ongoing, the eternal present. The flame will never be veiled, as God’s
presence will never be separated from humanity. Ryder says a prayer, and as he exits his
internal discourse comes alive. His thoughts reveal the nature of his conversion: Ryder
thinks of “a small red flame—a beaten-copper lamp of deplorable design, relit before the
beaten-copper doors of a tabernacle; the flame which the old knights saw from their
tombs, which they saw put out; that flame burns again for other soldiers, far from home,
farther, in heart, than Acre or Jerusalem” (351). The small flame burning in the chapel is
connected to flames around the world. At Lord Marchmain’s deathbed, Ryder pictures
people around the world praying; now he pictures the flame which soldiers throughout
history kept burning. The flame which the “old knights” saw is not a different flame. It is
not to be relegated to a severed past. The flame of the old knights is the same flame that
Ryder sees in the chapel, “burning again for other soldiers.” Even though these soldiers
are “far from home,” they are not homeless. Ryder is not homeless. And he is not
loveless. The flame is “red” rather than orange or yellow because the flame symbolizes
God’s love. Love is not something which we must wait for, longing for a perfect future. It
is not a feeling we only remember as nostalgia, a feeling irrevocably lost. The love which
Ryder sees in the flame is a love Ryder can feel right now, in the present. And he does
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feel that love. Ryder has had a conversion experience. Still an agnostic Catholic, he is not
certain that God exists, but he is certain that he can love himself in the present. His
internal discourse has gained a sense of wholeness. Ryder is no longer indifferent; he is
willing to skeptically analyze religious discourse. Ryder leaves the chapel looking
“unusually cheerful” (351); he is ready to face the “age of Hooper” with understanding
and love.
Ryder’s conversion in the chapel will not be his last. He will continue to
experience valleys and trenches of spiritual connection. But the flame will burn on. Love
in the present, the moral framework revealed in Brideshead, is not easy to practice. But
the practice is possible for anyone capable of having an internal discourse. The past and
future will always be a part of our realities, and it is good to have memories and hopes,
lessons learned and experiences to come. The external discourses we take in form part of
our own internal discourses in an ongoing consciousness-building process. The
discourses we have explored and those we have yet to explore are important; our pasts
and our futures are important. But Waugh’s novel suggests that when the past and the
future apply so much pressure that there is “no room for the present at all” (279), we can
lose our love for the present. We lose a sense of wholeness, and we are prompted to seek
wholeness in the perfection fallacy. We believe that only in the future will we have a self
that is worthy of love; we believe in a perfect version of ourselves that will never be
attainable because perfection is a fallacious concept. And because we are imperfect we
hate our present selves. When we hate ourselves, we are vulnerable to the ideology of
State perfectionism. The State wants us to believe that social perfection is possible and
that social perfection is possible only through obedience to the State. The State projects
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our self-hatred toward a particular group, a religious or racial minority, a class, an
ideology, etc. Then we believe we can eliminate our self-hatred by eliminating the
Othered group. Cara, Lord Marchmain’s mistress, observes that “When people hate with
all that energy, it is something in themselves they are hating” (103). Though Cara is
referring to Lord Marchmain’s hatred of Lady Marchmain, her statement can be applied
to State rhetoric as well. The State encourages its citizens to hate a particular group by
exploiting the self-hatred of those citizens. The State’s rhetoric is even more effective
when its leader’s energy is drawn from self-hatred: Hitler hated himself, and he found an
outlet for his self-hatred in Jewish and Slavic populations. When we practice love in the
present, the hatred-driven perfection fallacy is met with skepticism. We are able to work
towards self and social improvement because the present seems worthy of love, and we
want to nurture what we love. As an agnostic Catholic, Ryder is able to find love in the
possibility that God exists, in the enduring love which the flame represents. No matter
what religious or secular manifestation of love we perceive, we can all practice love in
the present. In doing so, we will have a healthy internal discourse, resistant to the
perfectionist ideologies of the modern world.
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Conclusion—
“A harmonium in a gothic case”: Realism and Satire as
Approaches to Moral Exposition
The analysis of moral frameworks in Greene’s The Human Factor and Waugh’s
Brideshead Revisited enhances our understanding of the novels as a whole. Yet, the two
works can be contrasted by their different stylistic approaches: While the tone of
Greene’s prose is darker and more serious, Waugh’s prose has a more satirical tone. I
argue that Waugh’s use of satire creates an obstacle to the effectiveness of the moral
frameworks portrayed in Brideshead. The realism of Greene’s delivery results in a more
compelling depiction of morality and moral obligation in The Human Factor. One of the
best ways of judging the moral complexity of a work is by examining how the “villains”
are treated; if the villains have psychological depth, if they are round characters, the
novel as a whole is likely to have depth. If the villains are flat and cartoonish, then the
novel is likely to have a more simplistic moral component. I will compare The Human
Factor’s primary villainous character, Cornelius Muller, with Brideshead’s Rex Mottram
in order to expose the disparity between Greene and Waugh’s literary approaches.
As I discussed in chapter two, Muller is a deplorable character. He is avowedly
racist, even suggesting that black people do not go to the same heaven as white people
(The Human Factor 157); he views other human beings as pawns in a game. The
extremity of his views might lead one to conclude that Muller is a flat character, a foil for
Castle’s considerably more humane views. However, Greene adds psychological depth to
Muller in various scenes. For example, when Muller visits Castle at Castle’s home, seven
years after their last meeting, Castle reflects that the evil figure of his memory “looked
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more human – perhaps it was that he had taken on with promotion greater responsibilities
and with them uncertainties and unanswered questions” (100). Burdened with obligations
to his State, Muller has aged. He has committed himself to a game which has demanded
much of him and which will always demand more. Muller is not an immortal archetype
of pure evil; he is a human—he has anxieties, he suffers, and one day he will die.
Muller’s anxieties parallel those of Castle in that both men have important decisions to
make which will affect the world. Greene adds a touch of humanity in Muller’s
awkwardly polite interaction with the family dog: “Buller fawned on the stranger with a
total lack of discrimination and left a trail of affectionate spittle on Cornelius Muller’s
trousers. ‘Nice dog, nice dog,’ Muller said with caution” (99). Buller treats Muller as he
does any guest, as another human who may or may not give him some pats. Unsure of
how to interact with the drooling English bulldog, Muller gives a tentative “Nice dog,
nice dog,” as if to assure himself that the dog is in fact nice. Muller does not lash out at or
kick the dog, even as he prepares his cruel plans for Uncle Remus. The rhyming
parallelism of the names “Buller” and “Muller” is a subtle reflection of Muller’s inner
contradictions—his humanity and his inhumanity, his desire to practice internal discourse
and his more powerful desire to suppress it. Muller plays the game, but he cannot play as
uncritically as Buller plays with the trouser legs of his be-slobbered victims.
Even Muller’s religious views are contradictory; he believes that there is
apartheid in heaven, claiming of the black South Africans that “I don’t suppose they’d
enjoy our sort of heaven” (157). Muller is so invested in the political game that he
believes it continues in heaven, an eternal game from which he can never escape. Yet,
despite his blasphemous religious views, Muller has the most religious faith of any of the
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characters in The Human Factor. When Castle seems skeptical that the afterlife exists,
Muller tells him “I’m quite sure there is an after-life” (157). Unlike Mottram, who has no
religious feeling, Muller has a complex and contradictory religious discourse. He has
attempted to justify his belief in the game by grounding that belief in religion; apartheid
is part of God’s plan. The South African State is carrying out that plan, and therefore
Muller is not only an agent of the State but an agent of God as well.
For Muller, religious conviction is a product of gamification. Muller’s religion, at
least in its current form, did not exist prior to his adoption of gamification as his moral
framework. While Muller may have been religious before he began working for BOSS,
gamification demands that its adherents prioritize the game. Therefore, any religion that
Muller had prior to his adoption of gamification would have been elided or reshaped into
something else, distorted to serve the game. The service that Muller’s religion provides is
to justify gamification and suppress his internal discourse. Muller’s version of religion is
simplistic and uncritical. His faith has no skepticism; he is “sure” that there is an afterlife
(157), and he is equally confident that his afterlife will be a desirable one. For some
people, such as Charles Ryder, religion can be a continued practice of fascination and
skepticism; Muller’s version of religion is the opposite. It is a suppression and a
justification—a suppression of internal discourse and a justification of a morally suspect
framework.
Muller is not oblivious to his internal contradictions; part of him is aware that his
moral stance is problematic. Spotting a brief questioning look from Castle, he says “Oh, I
know you are laughing at me” (157). Muller does not expect Castle to understand his
views because Muller is not sure that he fully understands them himself. The fact that
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Muller knows that Castle is internally scoffing at him indicates a level of perceptivity and
self-awareness that Mottram never displays. Muller must struggle to suppress his internal
discourse, his knowledge that his moral compass is untenable. It is ironic that Muller’s
religious piety serves only as a scaffolding for his inhumane moral compass. Muller’s
ability to perceive the irony of his religious views—and his recognition that others are
capable of perceiving this irony—demonstrates the complexity of his character.
The complex and contradictory nature of Muller’s character is further evidenced
through the subtle regret he displays in his interaction with Hargreaves. Muller suspects
that Castle is a double-agent before anyone at MI6 and, worried that Castle has stolen the
documents, he visits Hargreaves, one of Castle’s MI6 superiors (190). Hargreaves
attempts to reassure Muller that his concerns are unwarranted, but Muller’s anxiety is not
allayed. Muller cites Castle’s black wife and son as evidence that he is a double-agent,
but as he does so he seems aware that his racism is a burden: he tells Hargreaves, “You
take things so lightly over here. I sometimes envy you. Things like a black child” (194).
In Muller’s dialogue, there is a tone not only of envy but of regret as well. He is an
intelligent man, capable of internal discourse, and part of Muller would like to practice
internal discourse, but in order to be an effective player he must deny this aspect of his
cognitive architecture. Thus the man burdened by responsibilities which Castle observes
at his home is reinforced in Muller’s later visit to Hargreaves. Hargreaves is not
convinced by Muller’s evidence, but Muller’s anxiety proves justified. Muller is
committed to the political game and he is a sharper player than most. But he knows that
the game will drain his life, will require a constant effort of cognitive suppression, will
age him prematurely, and for these reasons he envies Hargreaves.
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Muller is well into the immoral side of the morality spectrum, but he has depth, he
has humanity. In Greene’s tragic and ironic portrayal, Muller’s humanity is expressed
through his inhumanity: as I discussed in chapter two, Muller is a pathetic figure. He is
the dead vulture, killed by his own folly, killed by his own efforts to kill others, and
buried next to those others in the same desert grave.
Waugh’s portrayal of Rex Mottram has less depth than Greene’s rendering of
Cornelius Muller. Mottram is a buffoonish character, whose daft gullibility is evident
when Cordelia tricks him into believing fake Catholic dogma: Mottram confronts Father
Mowbray, asking him “what about the Pope who made one of his horses a cardinal? And
what about the box you keep in the church porch, and if you put in a pound note with
someone’s name on it, they get sent to hell. I don’t say there mayn’t be a good reason for
all this…but you ought to tell me about it and not let me find out for myself” (Brideshead
194). Mottram does not question that any of these fake dogmas and rituals are true; he
has so little sense of religion that their falsity is lost on him. Mottram is only converting
to Catholicism so that his marriage to Julia will seem more proper. He wants to check the
box of conversion as efficiently as possible, and he is willing to believe—or act as if he
believes—just about anything. What Mottram objects to is the idea that Father Mowbray
has not given him all the “facts.” He confronts Mowbray as he would a political
colleague who has been holding out on him. Mottram is no doubt considering asking
Mowbray to join him for a few hands of poker to even the score.
The scene is quite humorous, but it is not realistic. Cordelia is in her early teens in
this scene (219). She is an intelligent girl who is known for her pranks, but she never
expects that Mottram will actually believe her tales: “Oh, Mummy, who could have
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dreamed he’d swallow it? I told him such a lot besides. About the sacred monkeys in the
Vatican – all kinds of things” (194). Cordelia is right to be surprised by Mottram’s
gullibility. Mottram is an adult, in his early thirties at this point (111). He has already
proven that he can handle matters in the political and legal realms, including helping
Ryder and Sebastian avoid a jail sentence for their public intoxication (119). Could a man
with the skills to gain power in the political world be so easily tricked? Perhaps, but his
obliviousness is not limited to Cordelia or Catholicism. As I discussed in chapter three,
he has no ability to love, no appreciation of art or education. He seems able to do nothing
other than check the right boxes, and he does so with efficiency and bombast. Even his
effort to get Ryder and Sebastian out of jail is hardly an intellectual affair, he walks into
the jail and is immediately given respect by the police simply by looking like someone
who should be respected: “Rex stood in the charge room looking the embodiment –
indeed, the burlesque – of power and prosperity” (119). Mottram shapes himself into the
State’s idea of a powerful politician, and therefore he appears to the police as a man
worthy of respect. Sometimes, we must all play certain roles in order to garner respect
and social approval. Yet, Mottram is not aware that he is playing a part. He is playing the
part because it is the only thing that occurs to him to do. There is no sense of selfawareness or irony in his psyche. Where Muller recognizes that Castle is inwardly
laughing at him, Mottram cannot recognize that Cordelia is pranking him. Muller
recognizes his own hypocrisy, even as he suppresses his internal discourse. Mottram
cannot recognize anything about himself because he has no internal discourse; no
suppression is necessary. Mottram is only good at one thing because he is only a onedimensional character. Waugh criticizes his own writing through Ryder’s assertion that
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Mottram is the “burlesque” of prosperity and power. Mottram is a caricature of power,
not a true example of a powerful human. Later, when Julia tells Ryder that Mottram
“isn’t a real person at all” (257), she is highlighting a flaw in Waugh’s novel—Mottram
is not a real person, at all.
Through this comparison of Greene and Waugh’s styles, I do not want to suggest
that there is a hierarchy of genres, with realism holding a superior position to satire. Nor
do I want to suggest that satire cannot be an effective medium for moral critique, or that
satire is incapable of portraying round characters. Indeed, moral critique is one of the
defining features of satire. For instance, Jonathan Swift’s “A Modest Proposal” exposes
the immoral attitude of the British upper class toward the starving, impoverished people
of Ireland. The style of the essay is hyperbolic, in that the dismissive and inhumane
opinions of the British upper class are taken to their logical extreme through Swift’s
suggestion that the Irish children be reconstituted into a “saleable commodity”—into
food (Swift). After all, when a rancher has too many cattle and not enough land for them
to graze, he can kill some of the cattle and sell the beef. With this logic, the Irish are
portrayed both as animals and as economic statistics. The logic of Swift’s “proposal”
reveals the morally fraught reasoning that the British government used toward the Irish.
Sean Moore notes that one of the politicians to which Swift is responding is Sir Robert
Walpole, British prime minister from 1721-1742 (Moore 682). Walpole famously said, “I
know the price of every man,” reflecting the view that human beings are judged by their
economic value (qtd. in Bent 557). His policies as Prime Minister included “efforts to
appropriate Ireland’s revenues without consent” and without transparency (Moore 689).
Walpole did not suggest that Irish people should be killed and turned into produce, but he

120
did view Irish people as units of economic gain or loss. While Swift’s satirical “Proposal”
is not intended as a realistic policy suggestion, the Proposal does reveal the complex
moral disparities in Swift’s society.
Swift’s essay demonstrates that satire is capable of moral critique, in some
instances more capable than realism. Why, then, does Brideshead struggle to achieve the
same level of moral critique with Rex Mottram? I have suggested that the issue lies in
Mottram’s lack of depth. While it may be argued that satire entails that the characters
being satirized are simplified—with certain characteristics hyperbolically inflated—I
assert that the satire genre is capable of critiquing characters with depth. For example, in
Voltaire’s Candide; or, The Optimist, the eponymous protagonist displays psychological
complexity even while he is being satirized: When Cacambo asks Candide to explain
what “optimism” means, Candide responds, “Alas!...It is the obstinacy of maintaining
that everything is best when it is worst” (Voltaire 140). In the early parts of the novel,
Candide attempts to abide by the optimistic worldview of his tutor, Pangloss. Yet,
Candide becomes aware that this optimistic worldview is flawed, especially once he is
confronted with considerable suffering; when life is at its “worst,” the optimist must
obstinately delude himself that life is at its best. Candide’s recognition of this selfdelusion—a recognition which he reaches through internal discourse—indicates
Candide’s psychological depth; the fully deluded optimist does not cry out “Alas!” before
explaining his worldview.
Candide is a satire of the Bildungsroman genre, in which the protagonist learns
life lessons and grows as a person. It is a satire because, unlike the traditional
Bildungsroman, the situations in which Candide finds himself are humorous and
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hyperbolic—e.g., the scene where Candide and Cacambo rescue two naked women being
chased by monkeys (119-21). Furthermore, Pangloss’s philosophy of optimism is a
satirization of Leibniz’s philosophy (Rubino 91). Voltaire is making a moral critique of
Leibniz, whose philosophy, in Voltaire’s view, does not offer a viable moral framework.
Voltaire’s moral critique would not have been as effective if Candide were a flat
character who never subjected his beliefs to internal criticism; we might still find
optimism absurd, but our findings would not have the poignancy that we get from
observing a round character come to this realization himself. The example of Candide
demonstrates that satire can satirize round characters as well as flat. Therefore, Mottram
could have been rendered as a more real, psychologically complex character and still be
satirized. Indeed, the perfection fallacy which Mottram embodies would have been more
poignantly rendered if Mottram himself had some awareness that his moral framework
was flawed; there is pathos in watching a psychologically complex character delude
himself. There is considerably less pathos in the delusions of a cartoon. The flaw in
Waugh’s depiction of Mottram, then, is not a flaw in the satire genre, but a flaw in
Waugh’s own execution. The value of the perfection fallacy resides in the fact that it is a
real framework with negative ramifications for ourselves and our society. Real
frameworks demand real characters, regardless of the genre in which those characters are
portrayed.
Brideshead is Waugh’s greatest work because it is his most sophisticated and
most realistic novel. Ryder, unlike Mottram, is a round character. His psychological
depth will continue to intrigue scholars for years to come. But Ryder’s simplistic foil,
Rex Mottram, offers less room for psycho-criticism. The perfection fallacy is a legitimate
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moral framework; it is reflected in the twentieth century’s striving politicians, in
commercials that sell bodily perfection in the form of a product, in the ennui that we
inevitably feel on the way to a college degree or a career promotion, in the self-doubt that
we feel at night, knowing that we are missing something, knowing that there is some
greater, pervasive spirit that exists but that we cannot bring ourselves to investigate. Yet,
Mottram is less an exemplar of the perfection fallacy than its caricature. In contrast,
Greene’s portrayal of Cornelius Muller is a true example of gamification; he is
committed to playing the political game, but his sense of irony allows him to see the
shortcomings of his moral stance. Muller has enough awareness to even feel some envy
and regret. Thus I conclude that, though both The Human Factor and Brideshead have
much to offer as works of literature, Greene’s novel is ultimately more successful at
portraying the intricate moral reticulations which pervade modern society.
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